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IDAHO LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
A respiratory therapist is hired by a hospital. Within the
next year he meets an underage male patient. After the boy is
released, and after the respiratory therapist has been fired, the
respiratory therapist molests the patient. Can the patient re-
cover in tort against the former employer?'
A parolee is given a job at a car wash. At the time of hire,
the owner of the car wash is told that the parolee is on proba-
tion for a sexual offense and is not to interact with minors. At
the car wash, the parolee meets a seventeen-year-old co-worker.
A few weeks after the co-worker quits her job, the parolee rapes
and murders her. Can her parents recover in tort against the
employer?2
A high school teacher, employed by a public school dis-
trict, has an affair with an eighteen-year-old high school stu-
dent. She is psychologically injured. Can she recover in tort
against the employer?
3
These sad, sordid questions have come before the Idaho Supreme
Court, presenting a myriad of issues regarding governmental immu-
nity, standing, comparative negligence, and even constitutional law.
There have been dissents and reversals. There has been legislation
protecting employers. But can a rule be stated about when liability at-
taches to the employer? Is there consensus on which facts are the
most decisive in these situations?
This article examines the tort duties that are owed by an em-
ployer to a victim of a crime or bad act committed by an employee act-
ing outside the scope of his employment. Looking at common law, leg-
islative action, and tort policy, I will argue that some room for em-
ployer liability does and should remain. I will do this in the context of
the three Idaho Supreme Court cases arising from the facts summa-
rized above, and I will examine recent legislation that is highly-and
in some ways excessively-protective of employers.
All three cases involve plaintiffs seeking to impose liability on
someone other than the main perpetrator of the wrong. To many, this
is instantly counterintuitive and unjust; only the "bad guy" should be
made to pay. A broader view of who is morally responsible comes only
with a broader view of causation. "But for" a word of warning or "but
1. Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 961 P.2d 1181 (1998), abrogated by Hunter v.
State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002).
2. Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755.
3. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003).
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for" a preventative step, the undesirable outcome would not have oc-
curred. More broadly, "but for" the perpetrator being employed by the
defendant employer, the dreadful result would not have occurred. The
causal link pulls us to examine the duty, if any, owed by the employer.
The finding of duty would broaden responsibility in order to avoid re-
currence of these or similar injuries.
Two general propositions form the foundation of the American
law of tort duty. First, if one undertakes to act, one must do so with
due care-reasonably-so as to avoid foreseeable injury to others.
4
Second, there exists, generally, no duty to undertake to act.5 One can,
legally, just sit by passively and let foreseeably terrible things happen
to other people.
These propositions come with exceptions. There is a duty to un-
dertake to act in order to protect people with whom one has a special
relationship.6 Some situations give rise to a duty to control a third
party.7 In Idaho, defendants will not be found to have a duty to control
the conduct of a third party unless there is a special relationship be-
tween the defendant and the third party or between the defendant
and the plaintiff.8 The word "special" is a conclusion and is not helpful
standing alone.
The challenge comes in deciding which of these rules applies to a
given situation. When is one acting? Is the act of employing someone
an "act," such that an employer must employ and supervise with due
care? The Idaho Supreme Court has answered this question to some
extent already: "Every person, in the conduct of his business, has a
duty to exercise ordinary care to 'prevent unreasonable, foreseeable
risks of harm to others.'"9 Employment of personnel is a significant
portion of conducting business. At one level, this answers the ques-
4. Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980). This is a
general statement of duty. Specifics relating to the case must be addressed, including
whether harm to the plaintiff was foreseeable and whether a finding of duty is well placed
in the particular circumstance. The factors articulated in Rife v. Long are helpful here.
127 Idaho 841, 846-47, 908 P.2d 143, 148-49 (1995).
5. Sterling v. Bloom, 111 Idaho 211, 225, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (1986), superseded
by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904A (2004), as recognized in Harris v. State Dep't of
Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 847 P.2d 1156 (1992).
6. Coghlan v. Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311
(1999) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965)); see also RESTATEMENT
SECOND § 314B.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999) (citing
RESTATEMENT SECOND § 315).
9. Id. at 247, 985 P.2d at 672 (citing Sharp v. W.H. Moore, Inc., 118 Idaho 297,
300, 796 P.2d 506, 509 (1990)).
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tion. A tort duty already exists in Idaho to hire, train, and supervise
with care, so as to reduce the possibility of harm to others.
Further support for the finding of a duty can be found by examin-
ing the employer's extant duty to control employees, and the em-
ployer's obligation, as a business or service provider, to protect pa-
trons. By virtue of standard rules of respondeat superior and agency,
employers are vicariously liable for their employees within common
law and legislative limits. Liability for negligent hire, training, or su-
pervision is not new. Our three cases present the wrinkle that the
employee perpetrators were not acting in the course of their employ-
ment nor were they doing what their employers wanted them to do;
rather they were off on pernicious frolics and detours. 10 The imposi-
tion of liability is still within precedent and public policy, especially if
the scope of the duty is limited to situations where the employer has
knowledge of special hazards. Recent legislation still further limits
the employer's scope of duty.
More support for the finding of duty in these cases comes from
the established obligation of the employer-a business or service pro-
vider-to protect certain people. Here the emphasis is on the relation-
ship between the employer and the victim. Schools have a duty to pro-
tect their students, hospitals have a duty to protect their patients, and
employers have a duty to protect their employees from harms and
hazards. The employment relationship with the perpetrator is unim-
portant to this analysis. Again, certain limits may be imposed on this
duty.
In our three cases, defendants arguably had both a duty to con-
trol the employee and a duty to protect the plaintiff. In other words,
defendants were in two relationships: one with the employee perpe-
trator, and one with the victim plaintiff; each relationship sufficiently
"special" to give rise to a tort duty.
Factually, our three cases may be at the outer limits of any duty
owed by an employer to a victim. In two, the key relationships were
over. In none of the cases did the crimes, torts, or bad acts take place
on the employer's premises or during the hours of employment. These
facts may have been sufficient to insulate the employer defendant
from liability under title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code." Yet nei-
ther case law nor legislation should be read to support a blanket
proposition that employers owe no duty to the victims of their employ-
ees' torts or crimes. Language in a 2002 Idaho Supreme Court case
10. See infra Part II.
11. IDAHO CODEANN. § 6-1607 (2004).
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could be read to deny any duty.12 That unfortunate interpretation
should be clarified.
Throughout this article I will use the example of a plumber that
is hired to make house calls, because most if not all readers have ex-
perience with these skilled and necessary tradesmen. The plumber is
called often in an emergency by a homeowner distressed by spewing
water or overflowing sewage. The plumber often encounters a female
alone in a home, who will ask him to walk with her far into the pri-
vate recesses of the house to repair the problem. The plumber is often
left unsupervised, alone with financial papers, jewels, and the like.
The plumbing company is aware of all this. If an errant and aberra-
tional plumber assaults the homeowner, or steals items of value,
should not the homeowner be allowed to sue the plumbing company if
it failed to do a reasonable hiring check on the plumber by looking at
least for past crimes of violence and theft? Or if the plumbing com-
pany ignored signs of the plumber's unscrupulous proclivities or in-
tentions? The vulnerability of the person in the house, the unantici-
pated and frantic nature of the invitation into the home-these are
factors arguing for a determination of special hazard or risk, and the
existence of a tort duty. Add to that the fact that the only reason this
particular and otherwise unknown individual was admitted into the
home is that he was sent out by the company and is recognizable by
garb or identification bearing the imprimatur of the plumbing com-
pany.1
3
The Idaho legislature, in 2002, passed title 6, section 1607, which
reads in relevant part:
Employer liability for employee torts
(1) No employer shall be directly or indirectly liable in tort
based upon an employer/employee relationship for any act or
omission of an employee which occurs after the termination of
the employee's employment unless it is shown by clear and
convincing evidence that the acts or omissions of the employer
12. Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002).
13. In more formal societies, "letters of introduction" were standard means for
one person to vouch for another's gentility. For a representative painting, see SIR DAVID
WILKIE, THE LETR OF INTRODUCTION (1818), available at http'//www.abcgallery.com/W/
wilkielwilkie4.html. For another visual image, remember the letters of transit at issue in
the movie CASABLANCA (Warner Brothers, 1942). In our society the fact of employment
serves as a letter of introduction.
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
itself constitute gross negligence 14 or reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as those standards are defined in section 6-
904C, Idaho Code, and were a proximate cause of the damage
sustained.
(2) There shall be a presumption that an employer is not liable
in tort based upon an employer/employee relationship for any
act or omission of a current employee unless the employee was
wholly or partially engaged in the employer's business, rea-
sonably appeared to be engaged in the employer's business,
was on the employer's premises when the allegedly tortious
act or omission of the employee occurred, or was otherwise
under the direction or control of the employer when the act or
omission occurred. This presumption may be rebutted only by
clear and convincing evidence that the employer's acts or
omissions constituted gross negligence or, reckless, willful and
wanton conduct as those standards are defined in section 6-
904C, Idaho Code, and were a proximate cause of the damage
sustained.
(3) In every civil action to which this section applies, an em-
ployer shall have the right (pursuant to pretrial motion and
after opportunity for discovery) to a hearing before the court
in which the person asserting a claim against an employer
must establish a reasonable likelihood of proving facts at trial
sufficient to support a finding that liability for damages
should be apportioned to the employer under the standards
set forth in this section. If the court finds that this standard is
not met, the claim against the employer shall be dismissed
and the employer shall not be included on a special verdict
form. 15
This legislation was not mentioned in the three main cases described
in this article, although it was enacted before two of them were de-
cided. While it provides significant protection to employers, it does not
preclude all liability.
14. IDAHO DRAFT JURY INSTRUcTION 2.24 (2003) defines gross negligence as "dis-
tinguished as a matter of degree from ordinary negligence. Gross negligence involves
carelessness that is so great that there was not just an absence of the ordinary care that
should have been exercised, but a degree of negligence substantially greater than that
which would constitute ordinary negligence."
15. § 6-1607(1)-(3). The legislation expressly did not limit any person's rights
under the state human rights laws. § 6-1607(4).
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This article will discuss employer liability for criminal, tortuous,
or otherwise bad behavior by an employee or a former employee. First,
I will discuss the facts and results of the three cases introduced at the
beginning of this article. Then I will discuss case precedent and recent
legislation, and finally the current state of the law in the context of
the three cases.
II. THE CASES
A. Doe v. Garcia
John Doe, a thirteen-year-old, was a patient for six weeks at St.
Alphonsus Regional Medical Center (the hospital) after a serious bike
accident. 16 There he received respiratory therapy from Fred Garcia, a
hospital employee. Doe and Garcia became friends. As Doe left the
hospital, Garcia gave him "his telephone number and told him to call
sometime, suggesting that they could hang out together."17 The
friendship continued, apparently with no sexual content. 8 There was
"no evidence that the hospital was aware of' these contacts. 19
Ten months later, Garcia was discharged from the hospital for so-
liciting an underage employee to go drinking, despite an earlier verbal
warning for the same offense.20 He began driving a taxi and kept up
his friendship with Doe. Doe and his family were aware that Garcia
no longer worked at the hospital, but they did not know why.21 Later
that summer, within a month or so of his firing, and about eleven
months after Doe was discharged from the hospital, Garcia began
sexually molesting Doe.22 Doe was, by then, thirteen or fourteen-
years-old. The molestation continued for three years. 23 No sexual ac-
tivity occurred on hospital premises.24 Garcia was sentenced to prison
for the crime.
25
16. Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 583, 961 P.2d 1181, 1186 (1998) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting), abrogated by Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002).
John Doe's real name was not revealed because he was a minor victim of a sex crime. The
records and briefs of the case are sealed. This fact pattern presents so many duty ques-
tions that it was used for a torts exam at the University of Idaho in Fall 2003.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 583, 587, 961 P.2d at 1186, 1190.




24. Id. at 587, 961 P.2d at 1190; but see infra note 216.
25. Id. at 583, 961 P.2d at 1186.
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Doe and his parents sued Garcia, Garcia's wife, and the hospital.
One cause of action was negligent hire. When the hospital hired Gar-
cia, it reviewed his application, contacted one of his past employers,
and conducted a half-hour personal interview. 26 Garcia's past convic-
tion for a DUI was revealed on his application. 27 Doe argued that the
hospital should have inquired about that and the circumstances of
Garcia's termination at the last place he was employed as a respira-
tory therapist, St. Mary's Regional Medical Center in Reno, Nevada.
28
Doe also argued that the hospital should have filed a written request
for access to his personnel file.29 This would have revealed that he was
dismissed for sexual molestation of a patient. 30
Another cause of action was for negligent supervision. There
were two moments when the hospital arguably could have taken
stricter action which may have prevented Doe's ordeal.3' Both were in
the fall of 1987; Doe was not admitted as a patient until August of
1988. The first instance arose shortly after Garcia's hire. Garcia
sought counseling from an Employee Assistance Program (EAP) coun-
selor, who was directly employed by the hospital.32 He told her that he
was "'quite preoccupied with sex,'" 33 felt "sexually] addict[edl,"34 and
stated "'any partner will do.'" 35 He also admitted to her that he had
been terminated from St. Mary's for sexually molesting a patient two
26. Id. at 579, 961 P.2d at 1182 (majority opinion).
27. Id. at 584, 961 P.2d at 1187 (Schroeder, J., dissenting). "DUI" is the crime of
Driving Under the Influence of alcohol. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-8004 (2004).
28. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183 (majority opinion).
29. Id. Absent a written request, St. Mary's would "release only dates of em-
ployment and positions held." Id.
30. Id. Also in Garcia's record was a California criminal conviction for sexual
improprieties. This does not figure into the majority's decision. The district court wrote
that "[tihe only evidence in the record is that this criminal conviction does not show up on
Idaho law enforcement records, and would not have been revealed to the hospital even if
an inquiry had been made." Id. at 584, 961 P.2d 1187 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
Throughout this article, I will refer to the points made as those of the dissent, al-
though Justice Schroeder's opinion consists entirely of the findings and conclusions of the
district court. Id. at 582, 961 P.2d at 1185 ("I adopt the reasoning and result reached by
the district court and set forth the pertinent portions of the opinion of the district court as
my dissent.").
31. Plaintiffs also claimed that Garcia should have received training in ethical
conduct with patients. The district court characterized this as speculative and imprecise.
Id. at 586, 961 P.2d at 1189.
32. Id. at 579, 961 P.2d at 1182 (majority opinion).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 583, 961 P.2d at 1186 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
35. Id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183 (majority opinion). The Idaho Court of Appeals,
characterizing these same facts, wrote that Garcia had disclosed to the EAP counselor
that "he was sexually attracted to young males" and that "while employed at another
hospital he had fondled a male patient." Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036,
1038, 895 P.2d 1229, 1231 (Ct. App. 1995).
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years earlier. The EAP counselor consulted with her supervisor but
did not tell any other hospital employees about Garcia's history.36 The
hospital admitted in its summary judgment papers that "the EAP
counselor would reveal information gained from an employee if 'some-
one was in danger." 37 It is hard to tell from the court's recitation of
the facts, but the hospital apparently required the EAP counselor to
reveal information of generalized harm to the hospital community, not
just if a specific person was threatened. 38 The hospital would be liable
for the Tarasoff claim because it was vicariously liable for the coun-
selor, who was acting within the scope of her employment.
39
The second moment when the hospital could have acted arose
around the same time, but was not the basis for the Idaho Supreme
Court's remand. Garcia encouraged several adult but underage em-
36. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 583, 586, 961 P.2d at 1186, 1189 (Schroeder, J., dissent-
ing).
37. Id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183 (majority opinion). But see infra note 39. Al-
though the court does not say so, that hospital rule probably had its genesis in the Cali-
fornia case of Tarasoff v. Regents of the University of California, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976).
For further discussion of the Tarasoff case, see, inter alia, D. L. Rosenhan et al., Warning
Third Parties: The Ripple Effects of Tarasoff, 24 PAC. L.J. 1165 (1993); Part I.D below.
The hospital's policy may have been broader than the duty articulated by the Tarasoff
court. The dissent in Garcia made note of title 6, section 1902 of the Idaho Code, requir-
ing "a mental health professional to give a warning only where the professional has
knowledge of an 'explicit threat of imminent serious physical harm... to a clearly identi-
fied or identifiable victim." Garcia, 131 Idaho at 586, 961 P.2d at 1189 (Schroeder, J., dis-
senting) (quoting IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1902 (2004)).
38. On the other hand, the district court found that there was "no proof that [the
counselors] were expected to report to the hospital any details of the counseling conducted
under the EAP programs; in fact, all of the proof was exactly the opposite: that they were
expected to hold everything learned through the EAP program in strict confidence to
maintain the credibility of the program." Id. at 587, 961 P.2d 1190.
39. Clearly the EAP counselor found herself caught between the duty of confi-
dentiality she owed Garcia and the hospital's disclosure rule. The court made the state-
ment, presumably gleaned from the record or from an inference based on the counselor's
discussion with the supervisor, that "[tihe EAP counselor was concerned for the welfare of
patients in the hospital after learning of Garcia's sexual problems," although he had made
no explicit threats toward identifiable victims. Id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183 (majority opin-
ion). At the time of Garcia's revelation, no state law rendered the communication privi-
leged. Id. The court concluded that "the EAP counselor had a duty to disclose the informa-
tion to others at the hospital. As the employer of the EAP counselor, the hospital is re-
sponsible for the failure of the EAP counselor to do so." Id. This aspect of Garcia's holding
has been changed by title 44, section 202 of the Idaho Code. The dissent, following inter
alia title 6, section 1902 of the Idaho Code, enacted after the incident, would have found
no duty because no specific victim was identified by Garcia, no explicit threat was made,
no expert testimony established that the counselor had violated the standard of care, and
the counselor had no administrative duties. Id. at 582-92, 961 P.2d at 1185--95 (Schroe-
der, J., dissenting).
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ployees to consume alcohol. 40 He was "reprimanded"41 or "warned" for
this behavior. 42 The court did not use this incident to hold that there
was a genuine issue of material fact concerning the hospital's negli-
gent supervision of Garcia, but rather based the holding on "the
knowledge the hospital had through the EAP counselor of Garcia's
sexual propensities."
43
The district court was unsympathetic to Doe's case against the
hospital. Initially the court granted summary judgment in favor of the
hospital for lack of proximate cause. 44 This was reversed and re-
manded by the Idaho Court of Appeals for further discovery.45 Even-
tually the defendant again moved for summary judgment, which was
again granted by the district court because, "as a matter of law, the
results in this case were not reasonably foreseeable."46 The district
court stated that the issue turned on the lack of duty or, alternatively,
"upon the limitation of liability as a matter of legal policy based on the
attenuation of the chain of proximate causation."47 Call it duty or call
it proximate cause, the district court was against allowing the plain-
tiffs to proceed to trial on the matter of the hospital's liability. When
the matter reached the Idaho Supreme Court, Justice Schroeder
agreed, reprinting the district court's opinion; but the other four mem-
bers of the court disagreed, vacating the summary judgment and re-
manding for further proceedings below.
B. Hunter v. State Department of Corrections
Corey Hood was on probation after pleading guilty to statutory
rape in a case that had included allegations of forcible rape of a child
under eighteen.48 He was rated at the maximum level of probation su-
40. Id. at 579, 961 P.2d at 1182 (majority opinion).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 583, 961 P.2d at 1186 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183 (majority opinion). Title 44, section 202(2) of the
Idaho Code, subsequently enacted in 1999, states that "No employer shall be held liable in
any degree on the basis of any communication between [an employee] and [an EAP coun-
selor] unless the employer actually knew, or should have known, of the information com-
municated before the alleged breach of duty or harm occurred." IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-
202(2) (2003).
44. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 588, 961 P.2d at 1191 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
45. Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 895 P.2d 1229 (Ct. App.
1995).
46. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 588, 961 P.2d at 1191 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
47. Id.
48. Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002). The
State of Idaho vigorously denied this in its appellate brief, noting that Hood had never
been charged with anything other than statutory rape. Reply Brief of the Appellant State
of Idaho at 1-2, Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (Nos. 26556 & 26578), 2001 WL
34648827 [hereinafter State Reply Briefl.
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pervision.49 His probation officer, Kim Spevak, was fully aware of the
record.
50
As a condition of probation, Hood had to find work.51 He eventu-
ally found work at Mr. Gas and Mr. Wash ("Mr. Wash"), a car wash in
Burley.52 Spevak met with Hood's supervisor, informing her "that
Hood was on probation for a sexual offense and was not to interact
with minors. Spevak did not inform the supervisor of the precise na-
ture of Hood's conviction."58
Hood performed fine on the job at Mr. Wash and was promoted to
supervisor.i4 Wendy Hunter was also an employee at Mr. Wash.55
Hunter was seventeen-years-old, although the supervisors at Mr.
Wash did not know Hunter's age. 56 Various employees observed
Hunter talking and joking with Hood on several occasions, but Mr.
Wash was evidently a lively place where the employees talked, joked,
and even flirted.57 No Mr. Wash employees were aware that Hood and
Hunter socialized outside of their employment. 58
Wendy Hunter quit her job at Mr. Wash. 9 Six weeks later she
drove with Hood, in his girlfriend's car, to his living place in Burley.6 0




53. Id.; see also Brief of Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent James C. Lynch,
DBA Mr. Gas & Mr. Wash at 8, Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (Nos. 26556 & 26578)
[hereinafter Mr. Wash Briefl.
54. Mr. Wash Brief, supra note 53, at 9.
55. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
56. Id.
57. See id. The court made the following unnecessary observation about Wendy
Hunter, a dead seventeen-year-old child: "Although [co-workers] had seen Hunter flirting'
with Hood, employees testified that Hunter flirted with most male employees at Mr.
Wash." Id. This factual assertion was seized upon by James C. Dale & Keasa L. Hollister,
Court Rejects Employer's Liability for Criminal Act by Off-Duty Employee, 7 No. 8 IDAHO
EMP. L. LETER 1, Nov. 2002. The court plucked this fact out of the appellants' reply brief,
Reply Brief of Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent James C. Lynch, DBA Mr. Gas &
Mr. Wash at 5, Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (Nos. 26556 & 26578) [hereinafter Mr.
Wash Reply Briefl, even though the same witness testified that "all of the Mr. Wash em-
ployees talked and joked with one another while they were working." Id. at 3. That testi-
mony would have conveyed the same point without causing the sniggering and eye-rolling
that will greet this sentence every time the case is read.
58. Mr. Wash Reply Brief, supra note 57, at 5. There is some discrepancy here.
Plaintiffs brief states that an employee did see Hunter and Hood kissing. Brief of the Re-
spondents/Cross-Appellants Relating to Defendant/Appellant/Cross-Respondent Lynch at
2, Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (Nos. 26556 & 26578).
59. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
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Together they smoked marijuana, watched a movie, and had sex.6 1
Then, "because he was bored," he knocked her unconscious and cut
her throat. He dumped her body in the desert.62 It turned out that
Hood had killed his grandmother a few weeks earlier.
63
Wendy Hunter's parents filed a wrongful death action against
Mr. Wash for negligence and against the State of Idaho for "negligent
supervision of Hood during his probation."64 The case went to trial and
"[tihe jury returned a verdict of $1.8 million."65 Negligence was appor-
tioned as follows: "Earl Hunter, 1%; Wendy Hunter, 4%; Mr. Wash,
20%; the State, 35%; and Hood, 40%."66
The Supreme Court of Idaho reversed as to all defendants.
67
C. Hei v. Holzer
Melissa Hei was a student at Kellogg High School. Beginning
when she was seventeen-years-old, during the fall of her junior year,
her relationship with her teacher, coach, and family friend, Mark Hol-
zer, was flirtatious and involved "express[ing] feelings" for each
other.68 In December 1995, she turned eighteen. One month later, in
January 1996, the relationship turned sexual. Within weeks rumors
were brought to the attention of the school administration, which be-
gan investigating. 69 In late June, the principal got definitive informa-
tion "that sexual contact [had] occurred. Holzer resigned the next
day."
70
60. Id.; Brief of the Appellant State of Idaho at 6, Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d
755 (Nos. 26556 & 26578) [hereinafter State Briefi].
61. State Brief, supra note 60, at 6. The court characterizes their sexual rela-
tions as "rape," possibly because of her age, or possibly because of evidence of forcible in-
tercourse. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 50, 57 P.3d at 757, 761.
62. State Brief, supra note 60, at 6.
63. Id. at 5.
64. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
65. Id.
66. Id. This astonishing finding, allocating only 40% of the fault to the murderer,
is discussed infra note 298.
67. Regarding the State's liability, the court found that "there [was] not substan-
tial and competent evidence to support the jury verdict that the state was reckless, willful
and wanton in its supervision of Corey Hood," because plaintiffs did "not establish a high
likelihood that Hood would murder." Hunter, 138 Idaho at 49-50, 57 P.3d at 760-61.
68. Heiv. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84, 73 P.3d 94, 97 (2003).
69. Id. During the course of this investigation, Holzer, according to his own tes-
timony, "flat out lied" to district personnel. Respondents' Joint School District No. 391,
Curry and Weir's Brief at 22, Hei, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (No. 26968), 2001 WL
34646976 [hereinafter Sch. Dist. Brief]. At that point none of the parties wanted the mat-
ter made public. Id.
70. Hei, 139 Idaho at 84, 73 P.3d at 97.
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Hei and her parents brought seventeen causes of action against
Holzer, his wife, and the school district.71 The district court granted
summary judgment to the Holzers and the school district. The Heis
appealed to the Idaho Supreme Court.
72
Because Hei was eighteen at the time of sexual contact, Holzer
had committed no crime.73 A threshold question was whether a tort
was committed.74 Justice Walters thought not, as the parties were
consenting adults.75 Hei attempted to articulate that she had a consti-
71. These included battery, assault, seduction, breach of contract, negligence per
se, mental distress, negligent infliction of emotional distress, sexual harassment, and sex-
ual molestation in addition to the claims discussed in the text above. Sch. Dist. Brief, su-
pra note 69, at 27. Many of these claims were unsubstantiated at the time the matter
went before the Supreme Court, so the court upheld the trial court's grant of summary
judgment. Hei, 139 Idaho at 88, 73 P.3d at 101. The seduction claim might have been in-
teresting to consider, but it was apparently abandoned. See generally Seamons v. Spack-
man, 81 Idaho 361, 341 P.2d 442 (1959); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 5-308 (2004).
72. Hei, 139 Idaho at 84, 73 P.3d at 97.
73. Id. at 85, 73 P.3d at 98. His teaching certificate was not revoked, but was
suspended for two years by an ethics panel, and he was obliged to undergo psychological
care and to do community service. Julie Titone, Teacher May Get Job Back: Ethics Panel
Won't Revoke Certificate for Student Affair, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Feb. 28, 1997, at B1. The
refusal of the panel to permanently revoke his license was influenced by: his tearful re-
pentance, the support of the Hei's parents, and his wife's support and corroboration that
their marriage was in trouble at the time of his relationship with the student. The basis
for the panel's finding was "a counselor's conclusion that Holzer had no longstanding pat-
tern of behavior involving young women" and was not "pathologically attracted to young
girls [and did not] fantasize ] about relationships." Id.
74. Hei's position, according to a contemporary news article, was that Holzer's
"persistent sexual advances amounted to rape." Julie Titone, Woman Files Suit Against
Ex-Teacher: Says Sexual Relationship with Former Kellogg High School Instructor
Amounted to Rape, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW, Mar. 19, 1997, at B1. Hei accused Holzer of
abuse of power and "a frequent pattern of taking advantage of his employment position
and initiating and demanding sexual contact with Melissa Hei." Id. "As a result of that
pressure, the suit claimed, Hei was incapable of giving her legal consent to sexual rela-
tions, which began after she turned 18 years old." Id. Additionally Hei produced the affi-
davit of a psychologist that she was "unable to freely, knowingly and voluntarily consent
to sexual relationships with Mark Holzer," and that she was "groomed" by Holzer. Appel-
lant's Brief at 5, 11, Hei, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (No. 26968). Without consent, the sex-
ual intercourse became criminal. Id. at 11. Further, Holzer's marriage rendered the rela-
tionship adulterous. Neither the court nor this article addresses whether a criminal act,
see IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-6601 (2004), and/or a breach of moral duty to a spouse should
give rise to a tort duty.
75. Hei, 139 Idaho at 89, 73 P.3d at 102 (Walters, J., dissenting). It is beyond the
scope of this article to address liability of teachers for flirtation, romance, or sex with
their students. Justice Walters was concerned that "[t]he ruling in this case will create li-
ability for illicit affairs between adult students and adult instructors not only in Idaho's
high schools but also in its colleges and universities." Id. The unanimous court agreed
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tutional right that was violated. The court could find no such right,
especially since she had attained the age of majority.
76
Hei had some success on her other causes of action against the
school district. The court overturned the summary judgment, and re-
manded the question of the school district's liability under Title IX of
the Education Amendments of 1972. 7 7 Title IX makes it illegal for
schools and their agents to discriminate on the basis of sex.78 This ba-
sic proscription has developed into a proscription against sexual har-
assment, 79 for which a private right of action for compensatory dam-
ages has been judicially established.80 The school district's liability
was predicated on its "[aictual knowledge of, and deliberate indiffer-
ence to, the teacher's ... conduct."8 ' Because there was a factual dis-
pute about what the district knew and when, the court would not al-
low summary judgment. The focus of the claim was the district's own
deliberate indifference, not vicarious liability or even constructive no-
tice.8
2
Hei's remaining two causes of action were closely linked, and the
court noted that she "blend[ed]" them together.88 The court tried to
separate them. One was a claim that the district failed to supervise
Hei herself, as a student.8 4 The other was a claim that the district
failed to supervise Holzer, as an employee and teacher.88 These claims
were for breach, by the school district, of a duty it owed directly to
plaintiff Hei.
Hei's claim that the school district owed a duty to protect and su-
pervise her was barred by the immunity clause of title 6, section 904A
of the Idaho Code, making an exception to governmental liability
that the duty of care owed by teachers to students did not include "a duty for students
who have reached the age of majority and entered into a consensual relationship with a
teacher that is otherwise legal." Id. at 85, 73 P.3d at 98 (majority opinion). The court did
not make any reference to any teacher code of conduct that was broken by Holzer, al-
though the matter is mentioned in the briefs. See Respondent Holzer's Brief at 2, Hei, 139
Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (No. 26968), 2001 WL 34644326; Affidavit in Support of Memoran-
dum in Opposition to the District Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment at 117-18,
Hei, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (No. CV-97-33519).
76. Hei, 139 Idaho at 86, 73 P.3d at 99.
77. Id. at 88-89, 73 P.3d at 101-02.
78. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
79. Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60, 75 (1992). For a quick
overview, see Martha McCarthy, Students as Targets and Perpetrators of Sexual Harass-
ment: Title IX and Beyond, 12 HASTINGS WOMEN'S L.J. 177 (2001).
80. See, e.g., Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998).
81. Hei, 139 Idaho at 87, 73 P.3d at 100 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 285).
82. Gebser, 524 U.S. at 291.
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"aris[ing] out of injury... by a person under supervision, custody or
care of a governmental entity." 6 The court reasoned that Hei, as a
consensual party to the relationship with Holzer, in effect injured her-
self. She was under the district's "supervision, custody, or care;" she
therefore could not recover against the district87
Although section 6-904A precluded liability for the duty to super-
vise Hei herself, the court ultimately concluded that the school district
did owe a duty of care to supervise its teacher, Holzer, because of title
33, section 512(4) of the Idaho Code.8 8 That section charges school dis-
tricts with the duty "to protect the morals and health of the pupils."
89
Based on this duty, the court found that the district had a duty to su-
pervise its teacher Holzer.90 The immunity of section 6-904A did not
86. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-904A(2) (2004).
87. Hei, 139 Idaho at 87-88, 73 P.3d at 100-01. The court cited Brooks v. Logan,
130 Idaho 574, 577, 944 P.2d 709, 712 (1997), superseded by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. §
33-512B (2001), as recognized in Carrier v. Lake Pend Oreille Sch. Dist. No. 84, 142 Idaho
804, 134 P.3d 655 (2006) (holding no liability to the school district for a high school stu-
dent who committed suicide). The Hei court's interpretation of section 6-904A took the
provision much further than it had been taken before. The court held in Harris v. State
Department of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295, 299, 847 P.2d 1156, 1160 (1992), that the
purpose of the section "was intended to render the state immune from the unpredictable
acts of third persons." See also Coonse ex rel. Coonse v. Boise Sch. Dist., 132 Idaho 803,
806, 979 P.2d 1161, 1164 (1999) (holding school district immune from liability to third
grader assaulted by older school boys). In Coonse the court stated, "It is clear that the
immunity arises from the status of the person(s) causing the injury, not the status of the
person injured." Id.
Here, Hei was not a third party, she was the primary party, and her reaction was
all too predictable-she got into a sexual relationship with a teacher who had begun flirt-
ing with her when she was a minor. Taken alone, the rigid circularity of this argument
borders on the absurd: the district does not have to supervise her because it was supervis-
ing her, it does not have to control her because it was controlling her, it does not have to
care for her because it was caring for her. But in context, the court was setting a bright
line at her eighteenth birthday: once that magic date passed, she could consent to sexual
relations, and so be it. The court does seem astonishingly blind to the romantic preamble
to the sex, which occurred when she was still a minor. The court was worried that if it
held otherwise, liability would extend not only into the adult realm of college and univer-
sity romance, but also into teenage suicides and the like.
88. Hei, 139 Idaho at 88, 73 P.3d at 101; IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-512(4) (2006).
89. § 33-512(4). This narrowly proscribed statutory duty has played a part in de-
cisions ranging from sexual abuse by a teacher, Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d
1238 (1986), assault by fellow classmates, Coonse, 132 Idaho 803, 979 P.2d 1161, and
sending away an ambulance that could have saved a student's life, Czaplicki v. Gooding
Joint Sch. Dist. No. 231, 116 Idaho 326, 775 P.2d 640 (1989). In Hei, the court carefully
steers clear of creating any negligence per se, expanding the cause of action, or creating a
new claim.
90. Hei, 139 Idaho at 88, 73 P.3d at 101.
IDAHO LAW REVEW
apply because Holzer was not "under the supervision" of the district in
the sense of "supervision" intended by the statute. The Hei court ex-
plained that title 33, section 512 of the Idaho Code does not create a
negligence per se duty, nor does it create a separate tort or a new
cause of action.91 In fact, upon review of the cases, it may be more ac-
curate to say that section 33-512 "exemplifies" the already extant
common law duty.92 Based on this duty-characterized by the Hei
court as "some type of duty of care [owed] to Hei"93-the court re-
manded for further proceedings on the negligent supervision of its
teacher Holzer.
9 4
To recap, the Hei court made some fine distinctions. The district
was immune, under section 6-904A, from a charge that it should have
supervised Hei to keep her from hurting herself. But, by virtue of the
duty owed her under title 33, section 512, the district did owe an obli-
gation to supervise and control its own employee. The district also
owed her a Title IX duty.
95
A final factual uncertainty may have colored the court's view of
this entire matter. The school district's link as the actual cause of the
sexual affair was not clearly ascertainable. In this close-knit commu-
nity, the Heis and the Holzers were good friends. Holzer's wife invited
Hei into their home.9 6 Their families shared Christmas. 97 Actual, "but
91. Id.
92. Brooks, 127 Idaho at 490, 903 P.2d at 79. Note the variety of verbs used by
the Brooks court in this passage:
Previously, we have ruled that when the legislature enacted [Idaho Code sec-
tion] 33-512(4), it created a statutory duty which requires a school district to
act reasonably in the face of foreseeable risks of harm. We again discussed
this statutory duty in Bauer v. Minidoka [School District] No. 331, 116 Idaho
586, 778 P.2d 336 (1989). In that opinion we noted that this statutory duty
exemplifies the role of the state to the children in school, which is a role de-
scribed as one in loco parentis. We quoted favorably from a Washington opin-
ion which pointed out that "the duty a school district owes to its pupils is '[t]o
anticipate reasonably foreseeable dangers and to take precautions protecting
the children in its custody from such dangers."
Thus, under our previous case law we have determined that a school dis-
trict has a duty, exemplified in [Idaho Code section] 33-512(4), to act affirma-
tively to prevent foreseeable harm to its students.
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
93. Hei, 139 Idaho at 88, 73 P.3d at 101 (citing § 33-512).
94. Id. at 88-89, 73 P.3d at 101-02.
95. Id. at 87, 73 P.3d at 100.
96. Titone, supra note 73. At the hearing on his teaching certificate, "[his
wife... cried as she spoke on his behalf, blaming herself for bringing the young woman
into their home." Id.
97. Sch. Dist. Brief, supra note 69, at 5.
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for" cause was uncertain. Perhaps the family connections would have
provided enough opportunity for the sexual relationship to proceed,
rendering the flirtation at school merely incidental.
III. SOURCES AND SCOPE OF DUTY
A. By Employing, Employers Have Affirmatively Undertaken to Act,
and Must do so with Due Care to Avoid Foreseeable Harm
The most basic source of duty is undertaking to act. If one under-
takes, actively, to act, one must do so with due care. The vivid image
of Keim v. Gilmore & Pittsburg R.R.98 illustrates this point. A steam
shovel car on a moving train with a projecting jackarm struck a truck
and "threw it with violence" against the plaintiff.99 "The whole trouble
in this matter lay with those who were operating the train. If they
were going to pull a car over the road with projections on the sides"
they needed to take precautions. 10 0 The general rule is that if one acts,
one must act in such a way as to minimize, to a reasonable extent, the
foreseeable risks of one's actions.
This is particularly true when one is on notice of the particular
risks of one's actions. In Keim the jackarm was protruding "eleven to
twenty-two inches farther out than any of the cars usually trans-
ported over the road."101 Other people in the area would not have ex-
pected the additional protrusion. The Idaho Supreme Court italicized
the proscription that the railroad should have taken steps, like provid-
ing a "lookout to prevent accidents from the special hazard of this
car." 0o2 This language is an articulation of the scope of the duty, tell-
ing defendants in general terms what they needed to do; in this case,
prevent accidents from the special hazard of what they had set in mo-
tion. Otherwise, they can be faulted for misfeasance.
0 3
Nonfeasance, refraining from action, doing nothing, is 180 de-
grees removed from setting something in motion or undertaking to
act. There is no obligation imposed by tort law to undertake to act,
even in the face of highly preventable, highly foreseeable harm to an-
98. 23 Idaho 511, 131 P. 656 (1913).
99. Id. at 516, 131 P. 658.
100. Id. at 518, 131 P. 658.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 519, 131 P. 659.
103. Id. at 520-21, 131 P. at 658-59.
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other. 0 4 In the cases at issue in this article, the employers did under-
take to act by hiring their employees, but they certainly did not en-
gage in the undesirable behavior of the employees. The employees'
acts were entirely out of the scope of employment and went way be-
yond negligence into crimes, intentional torts, or certainly what most
people would call "bad actions."10 5 It has been established, across the
nation and in Idaho, that noncriminal third parties can be held liable
for negligently allowing crimes and intentional torts to occur, espe-
cially when the third parties have a special relationship with the
criminal tortfeasor, the victim, or both. 106
In the world of torts, the plaintiff must establish a duty running
with some specificity to himself. "A robust conception of duty, as an
independent element in the negligence action, reflects the original
concern of tort law with a conception of civil obligation-a responsibil-
ity of some, but not all, actors to take care to act reasonably so as not
to injure certain others."107 A fairly recent Idaho case, Rife v. Long,
08
summed up well-known factors used across the nation to establish
duty.
Determining whether a duty will arise in a particular instance
involves a consideration of policy and the weighing of several
factors which include:
[Tihe foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, the degree of
certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the
injury suffered, the moral blame attached to the defen-
dant's conduct, the policy of preventing future harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to
the community of imposing a duty to exercise care with
resulting liability for breach, and the availability, cost,
and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.
104. Rees v. State Dep't Health & Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, _, 137 P.3d 397, 402-
03 (2006).
105. The Idaho Supreme Court concluded that neither a crime nor a tort was
committed by the married high school teacher who had sex with the eighteen-year-old
student. But see infra notes 301-02. However, the adultery, the lies, and the disparities in
age between the parties would strike most of us as undesirable and potentially psycho-
logically injurious.
106. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999); Coghlan v.
Beta Theta Pi Fraternity, 133 Idaho 388, 399, 987 P.2d 300, 311 (1999); Udy v. Custer
County, 136 Idaho 386, 391, 34 P.3d 1069, 1074 (2001).
107. G. EDWARD WHITE, TORT LAW IN AMERICA: AN INTELLECTUAL HISTORY 322
(expanded ed. 2003).
108. 127 Idaho 841, 908 P.2d 143 (1995).
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With respect to the foreseeability of the harm, this Court has
stated:
[F]oreseeability is a flexible concept which varies with the
circumstances of each case. Where the degree of result or
harm is great, but preventing it is not difficult, a relatively
low degree of foreseeability is required. Conversely, where
the threatened injury is minor but the burden of prevent-
ing such injury is high, a higher degree of foreseeability
may be required.10 9
A finding of duty does not amount to a finding of breach of duty.
But a finding of duty does often require the defendant to have his ac-
tions or omissions scrutinized by a jury.110 A jury will deliberate over
what courses of action were open to defendant, and at what cost. If the
choices defendant made did not match up to applicable standard of
behavior, the defendant will be found to have breached the duty.
The jury must then find a link between breach of duty and the
damage. The causal link must be factual, and then the legal questions
of proximate cause must be addressed: Is this defendant responsible
for this harm? Was there a natural, direct connection between cause
and effect? Could the harm have been foreseen by a prudent person?
If so, then liability should attach.
In other words, a finding of duty merely begins the analysis of
whether a tort was committed. Breach, actual cause, proximate cause
(scope of responsibility), damage, and plaintiffs fault, if any, must
also be addressed before liability is imposed. While these elements are
analytically distinct from duty, when judges are making duty deter-
minations they often let their minds run through the rest of the case.
The duty factors set out in Rife include some preliminary contempla-
tion of matters affecting breach (foreseeability of plaintiffs harm, the
extent of the burden to the defendant and community if liability is
found) and actual and proximate cause (the closeness of the connec-
tion between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered)."'
109. Id. at 846-47, 908 P.2d at 148-49 (citations omitted).
110. The question of breach will not be submitted to the jury if one or the other
party can establish negligence, or the absence of negligence, as a matter of law. S. H.
Kress & Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 515 P.2d 561 (1973).
111. Rife, 127 Idaho at 846, 908 P.2d at 148.
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B. The Duty to Control
Employers control their employees. Employers hire the employ-
ees, creating the relationship and choosing to "be the boss" of another
individual. Hiring is an affirmative act. Employers then train, super-
vise, guide, and discipline their employees. The presumption in Idaho,
as in other American states, 112 is that the employee is at will and can
be discharged even without good cause. There is a tort duty to hire,
train, and supervise with due care, or, as it is often phrased in the
negative, to avoid negligent hire and supervision. The vicarious liabil-
ity of respondeat superior and agency law do not technically involve
separate duties owed from the employer to the victim, but have the ef-
fect of providing an incentive for the employer to exercise control over
employees.
1. Respondeat Superior
The courts of Idaho are not strangers to the question of whether
employers are responsible for the torts and crimes of their employees.
The basic rule of respondeat superior" 3 is that a master, or employer,
is liable for the torts of the servant, or employee, committed during
the course of employment. This is a form of vicarious liability, not an
independently owed tort duty. The corollary of respondeat superior
was addressed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Normington v. Neely in
1937: "[A] master is not liable if the tort of the servant which caused
the injury occurred while the servant was engaged in some private
matter of his own, or outside the legitimate scope of his employment,
and without specific authority from the master." 114 Similarly, "if the
servant commits a wrongful act without authority, and not for the
purpose of executing the orders or doing the work of his master, the
latter is not responsible therefor."115
For example, in that case a cab driver had assaulted a competi-
tor, who then sued and received judgment against the cab company.
The court reversed because the assault occurred off duty, even though
the dispute leading to the assault began when the driver was on duty,
112. Except Montana. See Wrongful Discharge from Employment Act, MONT.
CODE ANN. § 39-2-901 to -915 (2005).
113. Respondeat superior is Latin, meaning "let the master answer." Podolan v.
Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 944, 854 P.2d 280, 287 (Ct. App. 1993) (quot-
ing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (6th ed. 1990)); see also Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber
Co., 135 Idaho 80, 14 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2000).
114. 58 Idaho 134, 140-41, 70 P.2d 396, 398 (1937).
115. Id. at 140, 70 P.2d at 398.
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the dispute related to work, and the driver was the owner's son. 116 But
the driver was not on duty and was not engaged in the service of his
employer, and lilt cannot be said that the employment of a man to
drive a taxicab contemplates committing an assault or battery, either
in the course of procuring passengers or preventing a competitor from
procuring them."" 7 The cab company would not be liable unless the
owner "advised, aided, abetted or encouraged the assault."" 8
Turning the Normington rule into a more positive statement, the
employer is liable in respondeat superior if the employee was acting
within the legitimate scope of employment or with specific authority.
The primary question is whether the employee is acting within the
scope of employment or with a purely personal purpose. The Idaho
Supreme Court and Court of Appeals have provided considerable
guidance on this point.
[I]f the employee's purpose is purely personal, it does not mat-
ter that the employee is using the employer's tools or driving
the employer's vehicle or some other activity that merely re-
116. Id. at 136-38, 70 P.2d at 396-97. "[Ihe father was under no more legal re-
sponsibility to restrain [his twenty-nine-year-old son] from committing a battery than he
was to restrain any stranger from so doing; and he was certainly not liable, as a joint tort-
feasor, for any battery he might commit, unless he advised, aided, abetted, or encouraged
the assault or had previously counseled the violence." Id. at 142, 70 P.2d at 399. Because
of a prejudicial instruction to the contrary, the judgment for plaintiff was reversed and a
new trial granted. Id.
This father can be contrasted to the parents of the vicious sixteen-year-old, who
knew of his propensities and encouraged him, thereby
constitut[ing] assent and participation on the part of the parents in the tort
alleged, and, if so, it would be regarded as negligence upon the parents' part.
It may be a question of fact as to whether the child knew of his parents re-
senting any resistance or admonition made by other adult persons whose
children were also beaten and maimed, for to encourage the child the parents
must signify their consent to a continuation of their child's conduct, or direct
or ratify the act, or that the child was at the time acting as their agent or ser-
vant in their interests or for their benefit. Under such circumstances the par-
ent would be liable under the doctrine of adoption of tort.
Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 642 (D. Idaho 1930); see also infra notes 146-66 and ac-
companying text.
117. Normington, 58 Idaho at 139, 70 P.2d at 398.
118. Id. at 142, 70 P.2d at 399. Conflicting evidence had been presented about the
owner father. One assertion was that he had discouraged the son from pursuing the mat-
ter or resorting to fisticuffs, and had offered the sage advice to go home and go to bed.
Other evidence had the father yelling, "Go get him, Charlie." Id. at 138-39, 70 P.2d at
397-98.
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sembles his or her employment. The employee must be en-
gaged in some type of work that is assigned to him or her in
the general sense of doing something to serve the employer.
... [Ilt is apparent that serving the "master" is required
in order for the conduct to be within the scope of employ-
ment.119
"Serving the master" encompasses
those acts which are so closely connected with what the ser-
vant is supposed to do, and so fairly and reasonably incidental
to it, that they may be regarded as methods, even though
quite improper ones, of carrying out the objectives of employ-
ment.
An employee's purpose or intent, however misguided in its
means, must be to further the employer's business interests. If
the employee acts from "purely personal motives.., in no way
connected with the employer's interest".. . then the master is
not liable.
120
The employee's purpose is a question of fact for the jury.121 The
employee who pulls a chair out from another as a prank does not sub-
ject the employer to liability.122 Nor was the Legal Aid Society respon-
sible for the malpractice of a moonlighting attorney 123 because the at-
119. Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 184, 983 P.2d 834,
838 (1999). The more colorful phrase, "frolic and detour" does not appear in Idaho juris-
prudence, according to a Westlaw search.
120. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 944-45, 854 P.2d 280,
287-88 (Ct. App. 1993) (quoting Birkner v. Salt Lake County, 771 P.2d 1053, 1056-57
(Utah 1989)) (citations omitted).
121. Id. at 945, 854 P.2d at 288.
122. Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 85, 14 P.3d 1074, 1079.
Tragic horseplay or "skylarking" resulted in death in Scrivner v. Boise Payette Lumber
Co., 46 Idaho 334, 340-42, 268 P. 19, 20-21 (1928). If the employee had stepped out of the
character of a servant, respondeat superior liability would have been precluded. Id. at
348, 268 P. at 23.
123. Podolan, 123 Idaho 937, 854 P.2d 280.
Donnelly and the Podolans had an eight year attorney-client relationship in
which Donnelly purported to represent them in two lawsuits. Through an
elaborate series of lies, forged court documents, false preparations for trial,
and false visits to the courthouse, Donnelly led the Podolans into believing he
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torney was not motivated by a desire to serve Legal Aid.124 Nor does a
son, whose father was his employer, subject his father to liability, if
the son was at his parents' house only to deliver radishes to his
mother.
125
Respondeat superior also applies when the employee is acting
outside the normal scope of employment but pursuant to the em-
ployer's direction or authority. The most obvious kind of authority is
express or actual direction by an employer to an employee. 126 This has
been fairly strictly applied in some cases. For example, in Smith v.
Thompson, an impressionable young man idolized his employer. 27
Several times the employer expressed to the young man his desire to
see a neighbor's ramshackle house burned down. 12 The employer
never "specifically told [the employee] to burn down the house, but
during the conversation, he mentioned that if someone were to burn
down the house, it should be done while [he] was out of town so that
he would not get blamed. " " The young man eventually did burn down
the house, and the neighbors sued. The court rejected respondeat su-
perior liability because house burning was not within the scope of the
was pursuing their cases when he was not. His misrepresentations were ap-
parently due to a mental illness rather than a desire for personal gain, but
nonetheless, the Podolans were injured.
Id. at 940, 854 P.2d at 283.
124. The court allowed the respondeat superior question to be resolved by looking
at the malfeasing attorney's intention rather than by a more objective standard, espe-
dally when the attorney was mentally ill. Id. at 945, 854 P.2d at 288. A later case, Wooley
Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., established that testimony from the employer about his
opinion on whether or not the employee was within the scope of authority is improper and
invades the province of the jury. 133 Idaho at 186, 983 P.2d at 840. In Podolan, the court
looked at the contract between the attorney and the employer, discussions between the
attorney and the employer, the conditional order of reinstatement from the bar, and the
employer's malpractice policy, which covered services performed only for the employer.
123 Idaho at 945, 854 P.2d at 288.
125. Casey v. Sevy, 129 Idaho 13, 19, 921 P.2d 190, 196 (Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiff
was injured as the son and employee was driving away from his parent's house. The com-
ing and going rule of worker's compensation cases is also applied in third party negligence
actions brought against employers on a theory of respondeat superior. Id. at 17, 921 P.2d
at 194. But no liability should attach if the employee was outside the scope of his em-
ployment. Id. at 18, 921 P.2d at 195.
126. See DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho at 184, 983 P.2d at 838 (disavowing a
strict requirement that work be assigned).
127. 103 Idaho 909, 910, 655 P.2d 116, 117 (Ct. App. 1982).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 910-11, 655 P.2d at 117-18.
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employee's job, nor was there specific direction to burn down the
house. 3 0 However, the employer was held liable as a joint tortfea-
sor.
13 1
Respondeat superior liability is a form of vicarious liability,
132
meaning that it carries with it the financial liability for the employee's
action but not the moral stigma of being deemed negligent, reckless,
or criminal. Nonetheless the financial incentive to avoid liability de-
ters the employer from ignoring the behavior of the employee. While it
is analytically different from a duty owed to a plaintiff to control a
third party perpetrator, respondeat superior creates the incentive to
control the employee.
In our three cases, the perpetrators were off on frolics and de-
tours ranging from immoral to heinous. 13  They were acting neither
within their scope of employment nor pursuant to any direction or au-
thority. Strict respondeat superior analysis is not applicable.
2. Agent Acting with Authority
Another source of employer liability can arise if the employee is
acting as an agent with express, implied, or apparent authority.'3
4
This is closely related to respondeat superior, but is not exactly the
same.135 Certainly the agent acting under express or implied authority
130. Id. at 911, 655 P.2d at 118.
131. Id. at 912, 655 P.2d at 119. Sometimes the employee is doing just what the
employer wants. If the employee is carrying out the employer's tortious or criminal pur-
pose, the employer is of course liable in his, her, or its own right. The employer and the
employee are joint tortfeasors, breaching the standard duty of care that each person or
entity owes another. This was the situation in Smith v. Thompson. Similarly, in the case
of the warring taxicab companies in Normington v. Neely, the company owner would have
been liable as a joint tortfeasor if he had "directed, requested, or inspired the commission
of the battery...." 58 Idaho 134, 141, 70 P.2d 396, 398-99 (1937).
132. Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co., 135 Idaho 80, 83-84, 14 P.3d 1074, 1077-78
(Ct. App. 2000).
133. See supra Part II.
134. Courts recognize that a power dynamic exists in some relationships. In
Smith v. Thompson, the court specifically mentioned the vulnerability of the young hired
hand, who "was easily influenced by [the employer] and was over zealous in his desire to
please the man who was a role model in his life." 103 Idaho 909, 912, 655 P.2d 116, 119
(Ct. App. 1982). On the other hand, the power dynamic between father and adult son was
not enough to create liability in the father in Normington, 58 Idaho 134, 70 P.2d 396
(1937).
135. See, e.g., Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing, Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 983 P.2d
834 (1999). In Wooley, the court discussed respondeat superior and agency in the same
section and did not treat the matter as an apparent authority case. Id. at 184-86, 983
P.2d at 838-40. Yet such a theory could well have been interesting to argue. In that case
a plumber was informally approached about doing some work. Id. at 182, 983 P.2d at 836.
He did not intend to charge for the work, either for his own gain or for his employer's, and
the work was done after hours. Id. But he did take a company truck filled with company
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can bind the principal, the employer. But more interesting are the
cases of apparent authority. "Apparent authority exists where a prin-
cipal voluntarily places an agent in a position where 'a person of ordi-
nary prudence, conversant with the business usages and the nature of
the particular business, is justified in believing that the agent is act-
ing pursuant to existing authority.'
" 136
In Podolan, the plaintiffs were the legal clients of a man posing
as an attorney working for Legal Aid. 137 His malpractice and misrep-
resentations cost them a chance at a sex discrimination suit. 3 8 The at-
torney deceived Legal Aid of Idaho as well. 13 9 The Podolans sued Legal
Aid.140 Their apparent authority claim was dismissed because the Po-
dolans had made statements belying any belief that they were Legal
Aid clients.' 4' The court expected plaintiffs to use reasonable diligence
to ascertain whether or not they were Legal Aid clients, which they
had not done.
142
This line of cases is not apposite to the situations at hand, but it
does highlight one aspect of Garcia and Hei. In those cases the em-
ployment relationship heightened the vulnerability of the child pa-
tient in the hospital and of the student (part of the time underage) at
the high school. 43 A boy patient is told to do what the hospital profes-
sionals tell him to do; high school students are required to obey and
respect their teachers.'" Also in these cases, plaintiffs' fault figures
into the analysis. Doe's parents and Hei (once she reached majority)
were faulted, at least implicitly, for failing to perceive that something
uncalled for was going on.
145
gas. Id. He was approached about the job during work time at the workplace by another
employee. Id. The court upheld a jury verdict for the employer. Id. at 183, 983 P.2d at
837.
136. Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 944, 854 P.2d 280,
287 (Ct. App. 1993) (citing Clements v. Jungert, 90 Idaho 143, 152, 408 P.2d 810, 814
(1965)); see also Clark v. Gneiting, 95 Idaho 10, 501 P.2d 278 (1972).
137. Podolan, 123 Idaho at 944, 854 P.2d at 287.
138. Id. at 940-41, 854 P.2d at 283-84.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 944, 854 P.2d at 287.
142. Id.
143. See supra Parts I.A-B.
144. See supra Parts H.A-B.
145. The vulnerability of the plaintiff was relevant to a finding of duty and ulti-
mate findings of liability. See discussion infra Parts IV.A., V.C.
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3. Classic Relationships
Certain relationships are classically "special" and give rise to a
duty to control. 146 One such relationship is that of parent and child. If
a parent sits by and lets his child attack another person, the parent's
failure to act may be scrutinized by a jury, and if his behavior was not
reasonable, he will be deemed negligent. The liability of a parent for
the torts of a child is not a vicarious liability like respondeat superior;
at common law parents are not responsible for their children's torts.
147
Rather, the parent can be held liable for his or her own independent
failure to control-the tort of negligent supervision'4--if the parent
has knowledge of the child's propensity or proclivity for a specific
harmful conduct and failed to take reasonable steps to guard against
the foreseeable consequences of the child's propensity for that specific
harmful conduct. 149 This is fairly strictly applied. For example, the
case against a father who allowed his three-year-old daughter to play
unattended by a snowmobile was dismissed on summary judgment
because he was unaware of any particular propensity of the girl to
climb and play on a snowmobile.1 50 On the other hand, a lawsuit
against parents of a sixteen-year-old was not dismissed on demurrer
when the complaint alleged that they knew about, failed to constrain,
and possibly encouraged their son of a "vicious and malignant disposi-
tion and the habit of persuading and inveigling smaller boys into se-
cluded places... [for the purpose] of beating, bruising, maiming, and
punishing."15'
Dean Prosser, in his classic treatise on torts, describes duties
owed by others besides parents, including the owner of an automobile
146. They often also give rise to a duty to protect. See infra Part mI.D.
147. Gordon v. Rose, 54 Idaho 502, 509, 33 P.2d 351, 354 (1934) cited with ap-
proval in Fuller v. Studer, 122 Idaho 251, 254, 833 P.2d 109, 112 (1992).
148. See Fuller, 122 Idaho at 254-55, 833 P.2d at 112-13 (stating that a related
cause of action, often brought concurrently, is negligent entrustment).
149. See id. at 252-53, 833 P.2d at 110-11 (holding that parents of three-year-old
left unattended in snowmobile with engine running were not liable to person run over
when the three-year-old pressed the throttle, because they were unaware of any propen-
sity of the child to climb on snowmobiles); see, e.g., Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873, 761
P.2d 1225 (1988) (finding a father potentially responsible for entrusting his son with a
poor driving record to drive a vehicle).
150. Fuller, 122 Idaho at 252, 255, 833 P.2d at 110, 113. The propensity of chil-
dren to climb on things, including machines, and to push levers and knobs, coupled with
evidence about what specifically went on that day, was insufficient, according to the ma-
jority, to allow the case to go to the jury. But see id. at 256-57, 833 P.2d at 114-15 (Bis-
tline, J., dissenting).
151. Ryley v. Lafferty, 45 F.2d 641, 641 (D. Idaho 1930); see also supra note 116.
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to control who is driving, 52 the tavern keeper to prevent intoxicated
patrons from injuring others,153 the owner of property to control the
conduct of anyone on the property "for the protection of those outside,"
and, most importantly for our purposes, the "employer [to] prevent his
employees from throwing objects from his factory windows." 154 Idaho's
iteration of these classic duties has been summed up as follows:
Examples when an affirmative duty to control may arise
include a parent's duty to control his child, an employer's duty
to control an employee, or a law enforcement officer's duty to
control a dangerous prisoner. The common element in each of
these is knowledge of an unreasonable risk of harm and the
right and ability to control the third party's conduct.
55
Thus, it is standard, traditional, and national law to hold that an em-
ployer has a duty to control an employee.
56
Control is the key. "For there to be a special relationship between
the [defendant] and the third person, the [defendant] must have the
ability and obligation to control the conduct of the third person."
157 Put
152. PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS 383-84 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984).
153. Id. at 384.
154. Id.
155. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 248, 985 P.2d 669, 673 (1999) (citing RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 316,317,319 (1965)). Even if a relationship does not fall
into the classical categories, another approach to determine sufficient "specialness" to
create a "special relationship" for tort duty purposes is to examine the degree of control
one party has over the other. See Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120,
124-25, 968 P.2d 215, 219-20 (1998) (finding that the dispositive fact was whether the
Youth Ranch had custody (the ultimate form of control) of the third-party malfeasor).
156. James Dale describes this duty as "the kicker." For his audience, that duty
may be a kicker, or incentivizer, to vigilance, but it surely is not a surprise. James C.
Dale, What's So Special About Duty of Care that Employers Have to Control Their Em-
ployees?, 8 No. 5 IDAHO EMP. L. LETTER 1, Aug. 2003.
157. Litchfield v. Nelson, 122 Idaho 416, 420-21, 835 P.2d 651, 655-56 (Ct. App.
1992). Bonner County was not liable when it allowed a prisoner, serving a jail term for
drunk driving, to drive himself to alcohol rehabilitation, even though his license was sus-
pended. Two counties were involved, because the prisoner had been found guilty of DUI
in both Bonner and Kootenai Counties and was serving concurrent sentences. The appel-
late court, the trial court, and the jury were willing to relieve the County of a finding of
duty because of the technical chain of custody of the prisoner and the failure of the two
neighboring counties to communicate. A third basis for justifying the lack of special rela-
tionship was that Bonner County officials had not witnessed the prisoner getting into his
pick-up and driving away. Id. at 421, 835 P.2d at 656. This case, vindicating a "hear noth-
ing, see nothing" bureaucracy, seems to fly in the face of the national authority creating a
IDAHO LAW REVIEW
in the abstract, this can sound rather circular: if you can and should
control the person then you can and should control the person. But in
practice, some distinctions may be drawn. A landlord did not owe a
duty to monitor and control the activities of a tenant, even when the
landlord and the tenants were linked in other ways, absent foresee-
ability of the type of incident that in fact happened, an affirmative as-
sumption of a duty to protect plaintiff or her class, or a right of control
over the third parties. 15 8 In that case, the court concluded that no
right of control existed in the lease.159 Lack of control became an ar-
gument for limiting liability.
Other limitations can be found in the common law as well.
60 Of-
ten the duty arises only if the dangerous propensity of the third party
is known to the defendant, as was seen with the parental liability
cases discussed above.161 In the line of negligent supervision cases led
by Sterling v. Bloom, the duty arises only if the defendant knew or
should have known of the likelihood that the third party will cause
bodily harm to others if not controlled. 6 2 So, in a later case, even
though a youth ranch had knowledge that an inmate was physically
special relationship between prisoner and jailor. See PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS, su-
pra note 152, at 376 ("There is now respectable authority imposing [some] duty... upon a
jailer to his prisoner."); see generally RESTATEMENT SECOND § 314A(4) (one who takes cus-
tody of another).
158. See Turpen, 133 Idaho 244, 985 P.2d 669. Plaintiffs decedent died as a result
of drinking too much in a home owned by defendant. Defendant was aware that raucous
parties involving alcohol were held at the house but could not have foreseen that "a social
guest would be killed by virtue of the guest's own lawful actions." Id. at 248, 985 P.2d at
673. Additionally, the court found no assumption of duty to protect plaintiff nor any right
of defendant to control the tenants "apart from some responsibilities arising out of a lease
agreement." Id. at 249, 985 P.2d at 674. This last finding was made despite defendant's
ancillary relationship with the tenants--defendant's father managed the property and
was also the college wrestling coach of the tenants and the victim (plaintiffs decedent).
Id. at 246, 985 P.2d at 671.
159. Id. at 249, 985 P.2d at 674. Another theory might have worked in that case.
The facts showed that defendant knew of the partying problem before renting to the ten-
ants. Arguably, the failure to "control" arose at the time of entering into the rental agree-
ment, making the transfer of possession of the premises akin to negligent entrustment.
See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 325, at 880 (2000). Precedent from other jurisdic-
tions establishes a landlord's duty to control a dangerous tenant, for example, one who
harbors a dangerous animal or one who has habit of firing guns in the back yard. Id. at
880 n.5.
160. In some jurisdictions, liability will not be imposed in the absence of an iden-
tifiable, specific victim; no duty is owed to the public at large. See Sterling v. Bloom, 111
Idaho 211, 225, 723 P.2d 755, 769 (1986), superseded by statute, IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-
904A (2004), as recognized in Harris v. State Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,
301, 847 P.2d 1156, 1162 (1992).
161. Id. at 232, 723 P.2d at 776 (holding that the State can be held liable for a pa-
role officer's negligent supervision of a parolee).
162. Id.
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aggressive; broke curfew; and committed burglary, shoplifting, and in-
jury to property, the youth ranch was deemed not to have been able to
foresee that the inmate, once released, would commit murder.
163
These threads of common law are picked up in title 6, section
1607 of the Idaho Code, which greatly limits duties owed after the
employer/employee relationship is over.'" Post termination, the em-
ployer's control is virtually nil. 165 Similarly, the legislation limits em-
ployer liability when current employees commit bad acts off the clock
or off the employer's premises, or, as the statute expressly states,
unless not "otherwise under the direction or control of the em-
ployer."166
4. Negligent Hire and Supervision
In the employment context, a similar duty to control arises at the
time of hire. Professor Dobbs writes,
[E]mployers must exercise reasonable care to "control" their
employees, which often translates to a duty to use care in hir-
ing, supervising, or retaining a dangerous person whose posi-
tion in employment puts him in a position to harm others,
even if in harming others he is not acting within the scope of
employment.167
While these duties arise out of the duty to control, they become sepa-
rate torts based on the employer's negligent action. Failure to use due
care in hiring creates a dangerous situation, just as an extended
jackarm on a moving train created a hazard in Keim v. Gilmore &
Pittsburg R.R.168 The more obvious the potential for harm the more
clearly dangerous the situation is, and the more obvious the duty. The
jackarm was dangerous because it extended, uncustomarily, beyond
163. Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch, Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 121, 125, 968 P.2d 215,
216, 220 (1998) (holding that no material issue of fact existed on this point). A similar
foreseeability question arose in Hunter, where the possibility that Hood would statutorily
or forcibly rape was fairly high,,but the chance of murder seems small, even in retrospect.
Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 49-50, 57 P.3d 755, 760-61 (2002); see supra
Part II.B.
164. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1607 (2004).
165. Id. § 6-1607(1). The employer may still hold the leverage of supplying a
damning reference.
166. Id. § 6-1607(2) (emphasis added).
167. DOBBS, supra note 159, § 331, at 895-96.
168. 23 Idaho 511, 518-19, 131 P. 656, 658-59(1913).
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the expected distance. 169 The hiring of a plumber without checking his
credentials is a hazard because of the extreme vulnerability of the
homeowner. If instead of hiring a plumber one were hiring a pizza de-
liverer, the vulnerability-and hence the danger-would be lower al-
though not non-existent. Elsewhere on the continuum would fall the
hiring, training, and supervision of a school teacher, a known sex of-
fender, and a respiratory therapist.
7 0
Extremely important in determining a duty is the employer's
knowledge of the dangerous propensities of the employee. The Re-
statement (Second) of Torts states that "[olne who takes charge of a
third person whom he knows or should know to be likely to cause bod-
ily harm to others if not controlled is under a duty to exercise reason-
able care to control the third person to prevent him from doing such
harm."'171
The negligent supervision tort in Idaho is discussed cogently in
Rausch v. Pocatello Lumber Co.172 The rule is generally stated that
"[a]n employer's duty of care requires that an employer who knows of
an employee's dangerous propensities control the employee so he or
she will not injure third parties." 73 This does not involve "imputed or
vicarious liability," like respondeat superior, but rather an allegation
of the employer's own negligence1 74 Also, "negligent supervision liabil-
ity encompasses conduct of the employee that is outside the scope of
employment, at least if the employee is on the employer's premises or
using an instrument or property of the employer."175
The negligent supervision cause of action turns on the employer's
knowledge of the employee's propensity to bad action. 76 In Rausch,
the question was whether the employer knew of the employee's ten-
dency toward "rough and dangerous horseplay.""' This was a question
of fact for the jury going to breach of duty."8 In Podolan, the employer
169. Id. at 518, 131 P. at 658.
170. See Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003); Hunter v. State Dep't of
Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 48, 57 P.3d 755, 759 (2002); Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 580, 961
P.2d 1181, 1183 (1998), abrogated by Hunter, 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755; Doe v. Durtschi,
110 Idaho 466, 469, 716 P.2d 1238, 1241 (1986). There was no allegation of negligent hire
in Hei, but that allegation was expressed in Garcia and Durtschi and implicit, at least to
some degree, in Hunter.
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 319 (1965).
172. 135 Idaho 80, 14 P.3d 1074 (Ct. App. 2000).
173. Id. at 86, 14 P.3d at 1080.
174. Id.
175. Id.; cf Podolan v. Idaho Legal Aid Servs., Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 945, 854 P.2d
280, 288 (Ct. App. 1993) (finding that a person acts outside the scope of employment when
"acting with purely personal motives").
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was not aware that the masquerading lawyer was doing work for the
Podolans, nor did the Podolans produce evidence of whether Legal Aid
knew or should have known of the attorney's involvement with
them. 79 This, coupled with the employer's lack of knowledge of the at-
torney's past bad behavior, precluded liability for negligent supervi-
sion in that case. 180
C. The Duty to Protect
1. Classic Relationships
At common law, classic relationships giving rise to a duty to pro-
tect include parent and child, custodian and ward (including prisoner
and jailor), guest and innkeeper, passenger and carrier, school and
pupil--"and the list is not closed."18 1
In line with these relationships is the duty a hospital owes to its
patients for happenings under its control. 182 The scope of this duty re-
quires the hospital to take reasonable steps to prevent patients from
coming to harm, not only from medical malpractice or common negli-
179. Podolan, 123 Idaho at 946, 854 P.2d at 289. The negligent supervision por-
tion of that opinion was affected by Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 5.1(c) which states
that
[a] lawyer shall be responsible for another lawyer's violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct if
(1) the lawyer orders or, with knowledge of the specific conduct, ratifies
the conduct; or
(2) the lawyer is a partner... in the law firm in which the other lawyer
practices, or has direct supervisory authority over the other lawyer, and
knows of the conduct at a time when its consequences can be avoided or miti-
gated but fails to take reasonable remedial action.
Idaho Rules of Profl Conduct R. 5.1(c) (2006).
180. Id.
181. DOBBS, supra note 159, at 875-76; see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS,
supra note 152, at 376-77; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965).
182. Butler v. Caldwell Mem'l Hosp., 90 Idaho 434, 439, 412 P.2d 593, 595 (1966)
("The generally accepted requirement is that a private hospital conducted for gain must,
in the care of its patients, exercise such reasonable care and attention for their safety as
their mental and physical condition, if known, may require.") (quoting Hayhurst v. Boyd
Hosp., 43 Idaho 661, 669, 254 P. 528, 529 (1927)). Also, "[a]lthough a private hospital is
not an insurer of a patient's safety, it must exercise such reasonable care toward a patient
as his known condition may require." Id. (citation omitted); see also Henderson v. Twin
Falls County, 59 Idaho 97, 99-100, 107, 80 P.2d 801, 802, 805 (1938) (affirming a hospi-
ta's liability for a special nurse's administration of boric acid solution instead of saline so-
lution).
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gence, 183 but also from third parties, including criminal third par-
ties.184 This duty arises not only because a hospital usually owns the
premises, but also because of the special vulnerability of the pa-
tient.1
85
Another protective relationship is that of employer and em-
ployee. This duty has most recently been articulated as "a duty [of
employers] to exercise reasonable care commensurate with the nature
of their business in order to protect [an employee] from hazards inci-
dent to the employment and to provide him with safe tools, appli-
ances, machinery, and working places."18 6 That duty incorporates li-
ability for nonfeasance as well as misfeasance. 187 Nearly all liability
for violation of that duty is within the exclusivity of Workers' Com-
pensation. 188
Under classic protective duty analysis, each of the defendants in
our three cases owed the plaintiffs (or plaintiffs' decedents) a duty of
protection. Doe was a patient at the hospital. 89 Had Garcia stolen
money from his closet or molested him on the premises, the hospital's
liability would not be in serious question. Hunter was an employee of
183. In Corey v. Beck, 58 Idaho 281, 288, 72 P.2d 856, 859 (1937), plaintiff stated
a valid cause of action against the hospital for burns sustained when hot water bottles
were negligently administered.
184. See generally 40A AM. JUR. 2D Hospitals and Asylums § 37 (1999). American
Law Reports notes several theories of recovery that have succeeded nationwide, sounding
in tort and contract, when healers have sexually assaulted their patients. Russell G.
Donaldson, Annotation, Liability of Hospital or Clinic for Sexual Relationships with Pa-
tients by Staff Physicians, Psychologists, and Other Healers, 45 A.L.R. 4TH 289 (1986).
These are not normally considered medical malpractice claims, so plaintiffs are not re-
quired to go through medical malpractice screening procedures like those found at IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 6-1001 to -1013 (2004). Cf Murphy v. Mortell, 684 N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1997) (finding that an allegation of coerced sexual intercourse "did not constitute
a rendition of health care or professional services").
185. A Louisiana appellate court addressed the helpless confinement of a sixteen
year old in a locked psychiatric facility in Samuels v. Southern Baptist Hospital, 594 So.
2d 571, 574 (La. Ct. App. 1992). The hospital was held vicariously liable for a sexual as-
sault by a nighttime assistant despite a finding that the hospital was not negligent in its
hiring or supervision practices. Id.
186. West v. Sonke, 132 Idaho 133, 142, 968 P.2d 228, 237 (1998). Usually a
worker's tort claim against an employer is preempted by workers' compensation. See
IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 72-201 to -230 (2006); see generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 314B (1965).
187. "In order to show that the [employer] breached a duty [plaintiff employee's
representative] must provide evidence that [employer] acted inappropriately or inappro-
priately failed to act." West, 132 Idaho at 143, 968 P.2d at 238. In that case, summary
judgment for employers was upheld over a dissent from Justice Walters. Id.
188. See §§ 72-201 to -230.
189. Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 579, 961 P.2d 1181, 1182 (1998), abrogated by
Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002).
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Mr. Wash.190 Had she been exposed to toxic fumes during her job at
Mr. Wash, Mr. Wash could have been liable even if the symptoms had
not manifested themselves until later. Hei was a pupil in the school. 191
Under common law, Hei would have been owed a duty of protection
from the school. In her case, she was unsuccessful in establishing that
the school owed her a duty of careful supervision to protect her from
Holzer because of the intricacies of title 6, section 904A of the Idaho
Code.192
2. Statutory Duty Owed to Plaintiff
The basic rule of respondeat superior notwithstanding, there are
some cases in which an employer is liable for an employee's torts even
though the employee was clearly not acting within the scope of em-
ployment. One category of these cases can be defined as the statutory
duty cases: when a statute directs the employer to ensure the safety of
a certain class of people, the employer may be liable when a member
of the class is injured. One of the most graphic examples is Doe v.
Durtschi.193 A public school teacher molested some of his fourth grade
female students "during school hours and while conducting or super-
vising school activities." 194 The court found that "[p]ursuant to [Idaho
Code section] 33-512(4), school districts in the state of Idaho are un-
der a statutory duty to protect the morals and health of their stu-
dents."195 In Durtschi, the school district could be liable for negligent
supervision, retention, and transfer of a child molester. 96 Similarly,
in Hei "[tihe school district owed some type of duty of care to Hei." 97
This was one of her few successful claims. 98
190. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
191. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84, 73 P.3d 94, 97 (2003).
192. Id. at 87-88, 73 P.3d at 100-01; see supra notes 86-95 and accompanying
text.
193. 110 Idaho 466, 716 P.2d 1238 (1986).
194. Id. at 468-69, 716 P.2d at 1240-41.
195. Id. at 471, 716 P.2d at 1243.
196. Id. at 471-73, 716 P.2d at 1243-45. The Durtschi court had to separate out
the school district's statutory obligation to indemnify Durtschi for his defense (non-
existent because his behavior was intentional, criminal, and outside the scope of his em-
ployment), the school district's liability for the battery of child molestation (non-existent
because the Idaho Torts Claims Act did not waive governmental immunity for claims
arising out of an assault or battery), and the school district's liability for its own acts of
retaining and transferring Durtschi from school to school (no immunity, so summary
judgment reversed). Id. at 470-73, 716 P.2d at 1242-45.
197. 139 Idaho at 88, 73 P.3d at 101 (citing IDAHO CODE ANN. § 33-512 (2006)).
198. Id. at 88-89, 73 P.3d at 100-01.
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When the employer has its own duty running to the plaintiff, the
liability need not be predicated on respondeat superior, and "scope of
employment" and "authority" questions are irrelevant. Hei demon-
strates this point a second time, as Hei was also successful at with-
standing summary judgment on her Title IX claim, 199 a claim predi-
cated on the school district's indifference to her right.200
3. Contractual Obligations
The plaintiffs contractual relationship with the employer may
render the employer liable under contract law for the torts of its em-
ployees. For example, in George v. University of Idaho, the existence
of a sexual harassment policy in the University's Faculty-Staff Hand-
book gave rise to a claim of breach of implied contractual duty to pro-
vide relief to sexual harassment victims. 20'
D. The Coexistence of the Duty to Control and the Duty to Protect
Oftentimes the duty to control and the duty to protect are inter-
twined and an attempt to separate them involves undue hairsplitting.
In the well-known and seminal California case of Tarasoff v. Regents
of the University of California, a psychotherapist, Dr. Moore, was
aware that his patient, Poddar, had the intention to kill Tatiana Ta-
rasoff. 202 Sadly, Poddar was successful in killing Tatiana.20 3 The Cali-
fornia Supreme Court allowed her parents to withstand demurrer
against Dr. Moore and his employer, the University of California, be-
cause Dr. Moore's relationship with Poddar created a duty to one fore-
seeably harmed by Poddar, namely Tatiana.2 4 This is primarily a
failure to control case, because the source of the duty is Dr. Moore's
pre-existing relationship with Poddar. But in finding the duty the
court noted the fact that the victim was specifically identifiable. 2o5 The
breach analysis likely turned on whether or not Dr. Moore should
have warned Tatiana, rather than whether he should have taken
199. 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
200. Hei, 139 Idaho at 87, 73 P.3d at 100.
201. 121 Idaho 30, 38, 822 P.2d 549, 557 (Ct. App. 1991). Breach of express con-
tract was also at issue in this reversal of summary judgment. Id. at 36-37, 822 P.2d at
555-56.
202. 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976).
203. Id.
204. Id. at 342-43. That opinion limits the situations in which that duty arises
and limits the scope of that duty. See id.
205. Id. at 346.
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more steps to have Poddar locked up.208 And, in common parlance, we
say that Dr. Moore "should have protected Tatiana."
Most interesting are the cases where both a duty to control and a
duty to protect exist, which is true in Garcia, Hunter, and Hei. The
plaintiff in Garcia was a patient at the hospital207 and Hunter was an
employee of Mr. Wash,20 8 so their claims against their attacker's em-
ployer could have been based on their primary relationships with the
defendants. The fact that a long time elapsed after the end of their re-
lationships with the defendant worked against them, and their cases
were based largely on the relationship between their attackers and
the attackers' employers. Hei's case involves two clear relationships,
each on-going at the time of the sexual affair with the teacher: she
was a student at the high school, and the teacher was an employee.209
It was her status as a student that proved to create her most legally
successful relationship and formed the basis of her most successful
claims.210 Analytically, these three cases involve both the failure to
control and to protect; this dual set of obligations is most vivid in Hei.
E. Public Policy
Because the tort analysis begins with duty, it is often the first
target for summary judgment motions by defendants. 211 If the matter
is resolved in the defendant's favor, the defendant is pleased to end
the lawsuit before significant legal fees have accrued. Others situated
similarly to defendant-potential defendants in other cases-also feel
some relief. The judge decides the duty question as a matter of law,
which becomes precedent. As the law becomes settled in a fashion
that exonerates defendants, the chances of being sued are reduced.
Insurance costs should reflect the "protection" and be lower than if a
206. See id. at 345-46.
207. Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 579, 961 P.2d 1181, 1182 (1998), abrogated by
Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002).
208. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
209. Hei v. Holzer, 139 Idaho 81, 84, 73 P.3d 94, 97 (2003).
210. See id. at 88, 73 P.3d at 101.
211. Duty questions can normally be resolved on motions to dismiss or summary
judgment even though some factual questions are involved, because the essential ques-
tion is whether the law suit should even continue. Breach and causation questions should
be submitted to a jury unless reasonable minds could not differ. See, e.g., S. H. Kress &
Co. v. Godman, 95 Idaho 614, 615, 515 P.2d 561, 562 (1973). Judges are usually viewed as
more sympathetic to defendants, although a recent study calls this into question in Idaho.
See, e.g., JOHN A. FIEDLER ET AL., JURY AWARDs IN IDAHO: A SURVEY STUDY OF PUNITIVE
AND NON-ECONOMIC DAMAGE AWARDS IN IDAHO COURTs (2003) (on file with author).
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duty were found.212 Potential defendants should lose less sleep worry-
ing about the emotional and financial costs of this type of litigation.
Yet causing worry to potential defendants is one of the goals of
tort law, although it is usually phrased as the desire to deter negli-
gent behavior by this defendant and others similarly situated. Those
others similarly situated includes those in the same insurance pool as
the defendants at bar. Insofar as insurance rates reflect the tort
claims made and won against similarly-situated insureds, class mem-
bers are not necessarily their brothers' keepers but certainly their
brothers' subsidizers.
One of the reasons for a precedential judicial system is that news
of the decision will get out and prompt liability concerns, which in
turn will prompt a review of behaviors. On the other hand, we want to
constrain or direct the behavior of the defendant and his compatriots
only up to a point, a point often defined by the elusive term "reason-
ableness." We do not want defendants to be so cautious that they are
paralyzed, nor do we want to place too heavy a burden on various con-
stituencies in society. These constituencies include potential defen-
dant employers, current and potential employees, and defendants'
customers.
Returning to a point made earlier in this article, the actual per-
petrator of the crime, intentional tort, or bad act is the person primar-
ily to be deterred. Criminal laws, tort rules, and social and moral
pressures are, and should be, placed on the perpetrators. But Garcia,
Hunter, and Hei involve situations where legal and personal disincen-
tives have been ignored by the perpetrator and have failed as a deter-
rent. 213 Plaintiffs' outcomes in these cases would, theoretically, deter
the employer from engaging in some act or omission but for which the
problem would not have occurred. This pressure from tort law may
not be necessary. Employers are already deterred from having their
employees commit unfortunate acts by a variety of forces, not the
least of which are natural human empathy for the victims and aver-
sion to scandal and negative publicity. Yet again, in these three cases,
these nonlegal incentives have proven ineffective in affecting alleg-
edly negligent employer behavior.
A finding of tort liability adds a direct financial impetus to
changing behavior. The financial ramifications of tort liability, along
with a natural desire to avoid the lost time and personal discomfort of
212. This assumes that insurance rates fluctuate according to tort claims as op-
posed to other reasons.
213. A question far beyond the scope of this article is whether some of the bad ac-
tors described in these situations were compelled to act by virtue of "sexual addiction" or
psychological abnormality, as opposed to choosing to act by means of rational thought
processes.
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being sued, should lead those who consider themselves to be potential
future defendants (Idaho employers) to behave differently in an at-
tempt to avoid lawsuits. The worst case scenario is that the burden of
potential lawsuits will be too high and the cost of goods or services
will rise. These arguments are often made, and are somewhat true,
when tort law is expanded; the countervailing consideration is the so-
cial need to prevent the type of harm suffered by these plaintiffs.
Also troubling is the prospect that the privacy of job applicants
will be invaded and that wide swaths of the population will become
unemployable because of errors in their pasts. Anyone with a criminal
record, especially a record of a sexual or financial impropriety, may
find it even more difficult to get a job. Employers, like most potential
defendants, are cautious and tend to overprotect themselves. 214
The reaction to Garcia's finding of duty was instantaneous and
loud. Clamors of dismay came from employers, frightened by their
perception of potentially "limitless" liability for bad acts committed by
countless former employees. 215 Critics pointed to the minimal basis for
a finding of negligence, the lack of specific foreseeability running to
the plaintiff, and the causal, geographical, and temporal remoteness
between the hospital and the crimes.21 6 Doe was a former patient,
Garcia was a former employee, and the acts were carried out off com-
pany premises, nearly a month after Garcia was fired. 217 The defense
bar, like the district court and the dissent, were quick to see the rami-
fications beyond hospitals and patients to businesses and employers
throughout the state.
214. See generally Kingsley R. Browne, The Silenced Workplace: Employer Cen-
sorship under Title VII, in DIREcTIONs IN SExUAL HARASSMENT LAw 399 (Catharine A.
MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004); Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112
YALE L.J. 2061 (2003); Eugene Volokh, How Harassment Law Restricts Free Speech, 47
RUTGERS L. REv. 563 (1995).
215. Holland & Hart, LLP, New Law Limits Your Liability for Crimes Committed
by Off-Duty or Former Employees, 5 No. 3 IDAHo EMP. L. LETTER 3, June 2000, noted the
shock felt by private and public employers alike, and referred to Garcia as a "nightmare
ruling."
216. Many of these objections go more to proximate cause than to duty. The dis-
trict court specifically found that "[alt no time during the continuation of this molestation
was there any connection between Garcia and the hospital or between John Doe and the
hospital." Doe v. Garcia, 131 Idaho 578, 583, 961 P.2d 1181, 1186 (1998) (Schroeder, J.,
dissenting), abrogated by Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 577 (2002).
Contra id. at 587 n.1, 961 P.2d at 1190 n.1 ("Doe testified that Garcia once told him that
while Doe was in the hospital, Garcia had offered oral sex. Doe said this conversation
happened about two years after he was in the hospital. However, Doe has no recollection
of the event itself, and Garcia denied it ever actually happened.").
217. Id. at 583, 961 P.2d at 1186.
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Employers read Garcia broadly and considered themselves to be
put on notice to be careful in hiring-to check references, perhaps to
check for criminal records, and to conduct thorough interviews.
218
Employers already had business incentives to hire people good at per-
forming tasks required at the job. Garcia encouraged employers to
also look at the criminal propensities of their prospective hires.219 Hir-
ing is the best time to vet employees. Once they are hired any attempt
at termination may be countered with threats to sue, the at-will rule
notwithstanding. Considerable harm might be deterred with more
careful hiring. On the other hand, considerable over-deterrence might
occur. Small, irrelevant, or dated crime records might render many
applicants virtually unemployable. This, in turn, might have more
impacts on certain races and national origins than others. Another
over-deterrence scenario is that employers may put themselves on a
hair trigger for firing employees at the slightest indication of an un-
fortunate propensity. This over-deterrence could lead to increased un-
employment, the loss of good workers, invasion of the privacy of appli-
cants and employees, and more wrongful termination law suits.
These fears are real but can be tempered by the recollection that
our negligence system requires not perfection but reasonableness.
220
The standard is set to a large degree by expectation and custom.
Standard good practice is that more sensitive jobs, involving more
vulnerable patrons, call for more intrusive' background searches of
218. See Paul R. Winward, Note, The Need for Change in Idaho's Reference Im-
munity Statute: A Proposal to Minimize Idaho Employers' Exposure to Negligent Hiring
Claims After Doe v. Garcia, 35 IDAHO L. REV. 343 (1999).
219. If allowed to stand, the jury decision in favor of Hunter could have deterred
both the State and employers from hiring probationers, parolees, or anyone with a crimi-
nal conviction. This would have been a blow to reintegration programs, especially reinte-
gration of people convicted of crimes perceived to have high recidivism rates. The court
did not mention the social utility of employment of convicts.
The point was not lost on the plaintiffs, Hunter's parents, but their argument
swung the other way, favoring public safety over the reintegration of sex offenders into
society. After their loss at the high court, they shifted their attention to the legislative
branch, campaigning for "Wendy's Law," right-to-know legislation requiring employers
employing sex offenders to notify the parents of minor employees. That legislation died in
committee. Dale & Hollister, supra note 57, at 2.
220. Defense-oriented readers may be snorting at this; mistrust of juries is reflex-
ive among business people. See, e.g., Dale & Hollister, supra note 57 (praising Hunter for
its "sharp rebuke" to the jury). However, jurors' glee at fishing into the deep pocketed de-
fendant has been exaggerated. For a careful and subtle examination of jurors' responses
to business litigants, see VALERIE P. HANS, BusmEss ON TRIAL: THE CIvIL JURY AND
CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY (2000). In Idaho a 2002 survey of state judges revealed that
"punitive and large non-economic damage awards are very rare in Idaho courtrooms," and
that "Idaho judges do not perceive any problems with Idaho juries being overly generous
to claimants." FIEDLER ET AL., supra note 211, at *1.
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prospective employees and greater supervision of existing employ-
ees.221 That standard need not change.
The higher the standard for careful hiring, the more necessary it
is for a prospective employer to get honest references. And yet, the
more crucial references become to hiring, the higher the damage
caused by an inaccurate reference. From the point of view of the per-
son giving the reference, the greater liability comes with no direct re-
ward.222 The Idaho legislature has sought to protect reference giv-
ers;223 but this conundrum could be addressed by additional privileges
and immunities for those providing references, so that they would be
more forthcoming.
224
Fearing potential lawsuits is as heavy a cost of doing business as
defending lawsuits.225 Employers would be delighted to lob off one
swath of potentially fertile claims, which is accomplished to a large
extent by the passage of title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code. But
even so, employers have not been, and should not be, permitted the
luxury of a complete no-duty rule.
221. See, e.g., Brian L. Lerner, Ten Tips from the Front Lines: Practical Guidance
for Avoiding Employment Lawsuits, 12 No. 4 H. R. ADVISOR: LEGAL & PRACTICAL
GUIDANCE 4, July / Aug. 2006.
222. STEVEN L. WILLBORN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 361
(2nd ed. 1998).
223. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 44-201 (2003).
224. Winward, supra note 218, at 345. This article suggests changes to title 44,
section 201 of the Idaho Code, the references immunity statute, and suggests steps em-
ployers could take to safeguard workers' privacy. Id.
225. Stephen C. DiUllard, Litigation Nation, THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, Nov. 25,
2006, at A9, asserts that lawsuits from current employees are a top concern for many
businesses.
So, what is tops on the corporate lawyer worry-list? Securities related
cases may grab the headlines, but more than half of the in-house counsel
cited employment as their top litigation concern. The workplace has become a
legal minefield .... Disgruntled workers are a fact of life, with aggrieved em-
ployees quicker to sue than almost any other group ....
Id. The flip side of worries over suits like those brought by Doe, Hunter, and Hei are ones
brought by workers hastily discharged out of fear of continuing employment with a Gar-
cia, a Hood, or even a Holzer.
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F. Statutory Constriction of the Scope of Duty
With the express intention of protecting employers, 226 the Idaho
Legislature passed title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code in 2000, af-
ter two years of lobbying by the Idaho Chamber of Commerce. 227 Sub-
section 1 addresses former employees, and subsection 2 addresses "off
the clock" employees. 228 Both subsections preclude employer liability
for acts or omissions of the employee absent clear and convincing evi-
dence of the employer's gross negligence, recklessness, or willful and
wanton conduct. 229 Subsection 2 purports to create "a presumption
226. H.B. 543, 55th Leg., 2nd Sess. § 1 (Idaho 2000). Even without the legislative
action, the scope of the duty could have been limited. For example, the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Torts limits employer liability for intentional acts by employees outside the scope
of employment to situations where the servant is on the employer's premises, on premises
on which he is privileged to enter by virtue of employment, or is using a chattel of the
employer. RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 317 (1965). The Restatement states:
A master is under a duty to exercise reasonable care so to control his
servant while acting outside the scope of his employment as to prevent him
from intentionally harming others or from so conducting himself as to create
an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to them, if
(a) the servant
(i) is upon the premises in possession of the master or upon which the
servant is privileged to enter only as his servant, or
(ii) is using a chattel of the master, and
(b) the master
(i) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control his
servant, and
(ii) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity for exercis-
ing such control.
Id. The Restatement rule covers the plumber example used in this article, as the plumber
would be on the premises by virtue of the privilege of his employment. See supra Part I.
Some room for argument might still be open to plaintiffs' lawyers, but ultimately
defendants would probably prevail under the Restatement premises limitation. For exam-
ple, if the bad acts in the cases are identified as sexual touchings (Doe and Hei) and mur-
der (Hunter), then apparently none of them occurred on the employer's premises. (The lo-
cale of Hei and Holzer's liaisons is not disclosed in the opinions.) But the thrust of plain-
tiffs' arguments in all three cases is that the flirtation, seduction, or grooming of the vic-
tims began when the bad actor was an employee, in areas under the employer's control.
The complication is that flirtation and friendship, even between minors and adults, are
not actionable behaviors. The actionable harm apparently took place off premises. So the
Restatement's common law limit on duty, had it been adopted in Idaho, would have pre-
vented our three cases from moving forward even absent any legislation.
227. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1607 (2004); Holland & Hart, supra note 215; see also
Liz Wyatt, Debate Continues on Employer Liability Bill: Legislation Would Shield Com-
panies from Off-Hours Acts, IDAHO STATESMAN, Feb. 13, 1999, at 4B; Thomas Clouse,
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that an employer is not liable in tort," 230 an odd phrase as plaintiffs
generally bear the burden of proof. With the standard of proof raised
to "clear and convincing evidence" and the standard of care lowered to
gross negligence, recklessness, or willful and wanton conduct, the
"presumption" seems to be unnecessary verbiage. The intent was
doubtless to convey the extreme distaste of the legislature for liability
in any but cases of extreme employer malfeasance. Subsection 2 does
contain considerable, yet appropriate, exceptions.
231
The statute shields employers to an astonishing degree in sub-
section 3. That section allows an employer, after discovery and upon
motion, a "right... to a hearing... in which the person asserting a
claim against an employer must establish a reasonable likelihood of
proving facts at trial sufficient to support a finding that liability for
damages should be apportioned to the employer."232 This constitutes a
right to a summary judgement motion with a twist-the burden will
be on the non-moving plaintiff to establish not only that reasonable
minds could differ but also that she or he has a "reasonable likeli-
hood" of prevailing at trial. This is the opposite of the standard bur-
den of proof on the moving party to demonstrate that facts are either
undisputed 233 or that no claim has been stated.23 4 The standard is
lower for employers than if they moved for summary judgement. In a
summary judgement motion, defendants have to prove that material
facts are not in dispute. Here the moving defendants can make the
plaintiffs prove that they have a reasonable likelihood of winning. In
a proceeding akin to a probable cause hearing, the judge will be able
to take away from the fact finder the ability to make factual determi-
nations and credibility assessments. This provides Idaho's employers
with more protection than is afforded to Idaho doctors and medical
providers, although they are deemed to be in such sufficiently endan-
gered supply as to be worthy of special procedures. 235 The employer




233. IDAHO R. Cv. P. 56(c); see also CRAIG LEWIS, IDAHO PRE-TRIAL CIVIL
PROCEDURE VII-21 (1982).
234. IDAHO R. CIv. P. 12(b)(6); see also LEWIS, supra note 233, at VII-10 to -11.
235. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1001 (2004); H.B. 489, 43d Leg., 1st Sess. § 1
(Idaho 1976) (codified at § 6-1001).
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ter,23 6 but creates a significant deviation from standard Idaho trial
practice.
237
The exceptions to limited liability, listed in subsection 2, are well
conceived, including situations where the employee was or appeared
to be engaged in the employer's business or under the employer's di-
rection and control--classic respondeat superior and apparent author-
ity liability.238 There was room for the legislature to include the same
exceptions for former employees as well. Consider again the rogue
plumber. He is fired but is allowed to keep his uniform, which he then
uses to obtain access to a victim's house. It may be negligent of the
employer not to recover the uniform before allowing the employee to
leave employment on general principles, but not necessarily in the
case of a voluntary and amicable departure. Few would argue it was
grossly negligent without more facts. Yet the uniform, or even just the
prior connection to a legitimate concern, may provide the entr6e
needed to a villain. This is one aspect of Doe v. Garcia. If an employer
had knowledge of an employee's criminal proclivities, terminated him,
but allowed him to keep a badge or a uniform, that might well consti-
tute gross negligence. Suppose, for example, an employer hires, but
makes no attempt to check the background of, a thief for the position
of bank clerk or telephone order-taker. The thief thereby gets access
to financial information, which he uses to steal after he has been dis-
charged. If a simple background check would have revealed the pro-
pensity to steal, the victim should be allowed to take the breach ques-
tion to the jury
Some employer liability remains after the passage of the stat-
ute.239 Obviously, an employer may still be vicariously liable for an
236. See Olsen v. J.A. Freeman Co., 117 Idaho 706, 717, 791 P.2d 1285, 1296
(1990) (holding "that the legislature clearly has the power to abolish or modify common
law (causes of action]").
237. This paragraph was greatly informed by discussion with Professor Alan Wil-
liams of the University of Idaho College of Law.
238. Thus the cases against the masquerading attorney in Podolan v. Idaho Le-
gal Aid Services, Inc., 123 Idaho 937, 854 P.2d 280 (Ct. App. 1993), and the well-
intentioned plumber in Wooley Trust v. DeBest Plumbing Inc., 133 Idaho 180, 983 P.2d
834 (1999), would probably not be excluded by this legislation.
239. James Dale had the following comments about the legislation after Hei:
While no Idaho appellate court has yet had the chance to fully examine
the workings of the state statute that purports to limit employer liability for
the acts of former employees or those persons acting outside the course and
scope of their employment, the fact remains that not all duties are elimi-
nated. The Hei case doesn't change that result, but it does afford all of this
state's employers an opportunity to read the court's temperature on matters
of that kind. Because cases that reach the court involving a duty-to-control
issue usually involve rather disturbing facts, it's important to recognize that
the courts aren't inclined to cut employers any breaks. Put another way, the
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employee's negligent performance of duty as well as liable for its own
negligent hiring, training, or supervision. They may also be liable
when, as the legislation expressly states, the employee is using the job
itself or the appearance of the job to further the bad behavior, and is
"wholly or partially engaged in the employer's business."240 The intent
of this legislation is clear, but questions might arise about how
broadly to read this clause. For example, when did Holzer's "flirting"
move from friendly student relations to his own personal frolic? When
did the chair-removing prankster in Rausch cease to be doing the em-
ployer's work?
A remaining question is whether the employer remains liable for
creating a dangerous situation 241 which comes to its climax, thereby
causing injury, after termination of the employee. The statutory lan-
guage probably precludes liability, especially given the stated intent
of the legislature to protect employers, because it states that "[n]o
employer shall be directly or indirectly liable in tort based upon an
employer/employee relationship."242 If the creation of the dangerous
situation is the hire or supervision of the employee, that means the
dangerous situation is the creation of the employment relationship.
The statute expressly disavows liability "based upon" the relationship.
But, according to the Idaho Statesman, when this matter was being
debated, "Idaho Trial Lawyers Association President Steven Andersen
said that day-care centers would be able to hire child molesters with-
out any liability."24a Pat Olsson, described as "an attorney who helped
draft the bill," replied, "'That is simply fallacious." 2" This puffing
from both sides should perhaps be put aside. But Steven Andersen's
point is right at the heart of the legislation. Suppose a day care hires
a child molester. Failure to do a background check on a day care
worker may well constitute gross negligence or recklessness. But as-
sume the credentials were reasonably good at the time of hire, and
the worker's proclivities come to light only later. The worker may be
instantly fired. But, to avoid gross negligence and recklessness, the
day care should probably notify all parents of currently and formerly
employer must live up to its duties. In the meantime, you must remain espe-
cially vigilant to look for signs of budding relationships or other inappropriate
conduct that may expose your company to potential liability.
Dale, supra note 156.
240. § 6-1607(2).
241. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 321 (1965).
242. § 6-1607(1) (emphasis added).
243. Wyatt, supra note 227.
244. Id.
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enrolled children who came into contact with the worker. Otherwise
they might engage in the common practice of hiring this person--one
they knew and trusted-as a home babysitter, or otherwise maintain-
ing contact. The day care center will not be eager to broadcast the un-
suitability of this worker for fear of losing business or being sued by
the worker for calumnious defamation, but public safety may well tip
in favor of disclosure and warning to the parents.
IV. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
Title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code was not argued or dis-
cussed in any of our three cases, but would clearly affect them had
they been brought after 1999. In this section I will discuss what re-
mains of the cases after section 6-1607, with an eye to testing the lim-
its of liability for Idaho employers. Certainly duties remain requiring
employers to be careful in the hire, supervision, training, and control
of workers.
A. Doe v. Garcia
This case would probably be dismissed after passage of the stat-
ute, but is still instructive to employers on how to conduct their em-
ployment practices. 245 If Doe's molestation had taken place at the
hospital or pursuant to Garcia's duties (for example, on a home visit
performing outpatient services), the negligent hire and supervision
claims would still have been viable. It remains worthwhile to consider
the sharply divided attitudes of the judges in this case.
1. Negligent Hire
Plaintiffs alleged that the hospital should have paid more atten-
tion to the DUI conviction on his job application,246 and, more impor-
245. 131 Idaho 578, 961 P.2d 1181 (1998), abrogated by Hunter v. State Dep't of
Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 57 P.3d 755 (2002). Garcia was discussed during deliberations on the
legislation. Clouse, supra note 227. Nonetheless, an argument remains that the suit was
not for an act or omission of an employee occurring after the employee's termination, but
rather was for the act or omission of the employer before the employee's hire. Put another
way, the suit could be characterized as one where the employer created a dangerous
situation. See RESTATEMENT SECOND § 321.
246. A matter not discussed by the courts or the parties was whether the notation
of a DUI on an employment application should prompt closer scrutiny by the employer.
For example, is it indicative of an alcohol problem? of a scoff-law attitude? of a propensity
for reckless behavior? What further steps should be taken by an employer to assess the
fitness of a job applicant with a DUI on the record? How dependent is that answer on the
duties associated with the job applied for? If a DUI is considered to be evidence of dubious
character, quite a few people will become unhirable. Idaho convicted 7,277 drivers for
DUI in 2001. NATIONAL HARDCORE DRUNK DRIVER PROJECT, IDAHO STATE PROFILE 1,
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tantly, should have contacted his former employer, St. Mary's Hospi-
tal, in Nevada. His personnel file at St. Mary's would have revealed
that he was dismissed for sexual molestation of a patient. 247 The court
found that there existed a "genuine issue of material fact whether the
hospital was negligent in hiring [Garcia]."248
The majority and the dissent were in thorough disagreement
with each other on nearly every aspect of the case, even reading the
record differently. 249 Garcia's reversal of summary judgment, allowing
plaintiff to proceed to trial on the negligent hire, is not particularly
striking, nor is it surprising that the duty should be on behalf of a pa-
tient in the hospital. If the hospital had been careless as to Garcia's
credentials as a respiratory therapist, and improper treatment had
resulted, this case would be run of the mill. The type of harm-
emotional and psychic, rather than physical-was somewhat unusual,
but had physical harm occurred to a patient, parasitic emotional harm
would have been a standard item of damage. The manner in which
the emotional harm was inflicted-via sexual abuse-is unusual but
not unheard of.
25o
The alternative to finding for plaintiff was for the court to deter-
mine either that this scenario was not within the scope of the duty of
negligent hire cases or that, as a matter of law, there was no proxi-
mate cause. The case does not appear to have been argued in a fash-
ion that would lead to such a result. Also, a finding that the scope of a
hiring employer's duty did not extend to protecting patrons from sex-
ual abuse seems unwise. Respiratory therapy in a hospital requires
fairly close personal contact in a setting where the patient is scantily
clad in a hospital gown, weak, and lying in a bed. Had the molestation
occurred in the hospital room, this would be a different case, and it is
http'/dwidata.org/state-prof/idaho.html (last visited Mar. 27, 2007). Even to be hired as
an Idaho State Police Officer, a DUI on one's record is acceptable if it occurred more than
five years before the application. Idaho State Police Trooper Application Addendum,
http'i/www.isp.state.id.us/hrflrooperAddendum.html#DrugPolicy (last visited Mar. 27,
2007).
247. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183.
248. Id. Also in Garcia's record was a California criminal conviction for sexual
improprieties. This does not figure into the majority's decision. The dissent noted that
"Itihe only evidence in the record is that this criminal conviction does not show up on
Idaho law enforcement records, and would not have been revealed to the hospital even if
an inquiry had been made." Id. at 584, 961 P.2d at 1187 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
249. Compare the majority's assertions regarding St. Mary's procedures for re-
lease of information, id. at 580, 961 P.2d at 1183, with the dissent's assertions about what
was in the record, id. at 582, 961 P.2d at 1185.
250. See Donaldson, supra note 184.
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unlikely that the hospital would credibly be arguing that the protec-
tion of the patients from abuse was not within its scope of duty.
What is striking about the pro-plaintiff result in Garcia is the
proximate cause problem. The harm occurred off-site many months
after the employee was hired-eleven months after the patient was
discharged and one month after the employee was terminated. Ex-
pressed in proximate cause terminology, the injury was remote and
indirect, far removed from the allegedly negligent act of hiring. The
manner in which the injury occurred-the grooming over a long time
period-was possibly unforeseeable, although this begs the question:
if the hospital had known more about the employee, would it have
been able to foresee this type of long-term grooming and ultimate mo-
lestation? The court of appeal's decision addresses proximate cause at
length. 251 Both appellate courts determined that proximate cause was
a jury question,252 decisions that were correct according to Idaho
precedent and standard common law. It is this aspect of the decisions
that title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code addresses. The statute set-
tles the proximate cause question, keeping the question from the jury
except in cases of gross employer negligence or worse.
The proximate harm issues-the remoteness of the harm from
the time and place of the possible negligence of the hospital and the
arguably unforeseeable set of events-are what make this case weird
and unusual. But those are wrinkles or details. The essence of the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision remains true: employers should be
sensitive to the situations they create. Choosing to employ someone
amounts to choosing to vouch for the person. The vivid truth of Garcia
is that parents would not allow a stranger in the street to converse
with or touch or befriend their thirteen-year-old son, but they would
allow a hospital worker to do so. Both the Garcia and the Sisters of
Holy Cross opinions require the hospital to be cognizant of its respon-




This cause of action is similar to negligent hire, except that the
allegedly negligent supervision covered a longer time period. The hos-
pital's information about Garcia was expanded to include the inap-
propriate invitations to the young men on staff and, constructively,
251. Doe v. Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho 1036, 1039-44, 895 P.2d 1229,
1232-37 (Ct. App. 1995).
252. Id. at 1041, 895 P.2d at 1234; Garcia, 131 Idaho at 588, 961 P.2d at 1191
(Schroeder, J., dissenting).
253. See supra notes 16-47 and accompanying text.
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the revelations to the Employee Assistance Program (EAP) counselor.
Given this knowledge, Garcia should arguably have been supervised
differently or terminated. How this should have been handled is of
continuing interest to Idaho employers.
Plaintiff argued that
the hospital, as a tertiary care provider in the community,
should have been aware of the proclivity of pedophiles to re-
cruit and groom potential victims over a period of time, and
that the invitation to the two young men could have been con-
strued as the first move in the grooming process of a pedo-
phile.
25 4
The district court cited evidence 255 that the young men invited out by
Garcia thought he was "weird and perhaps homosexual" but did not
feel threatened.25 6 The district court had concluded that "[m]ere ho-
mosexuality... would not give rise to any suspicion of pedophilia,"
257
and further observed that the young men were eighteen and nineteen,
not children like Doe.258 It also saw no reports of overlooked com-
plaints from anyone. 25 9 On the other hand, most would agree260 that
the more the hospital got evidence that this employee was sexually
troubled, prone to inappropriate suggestions (like inviting the co-
workers to drink illegally), and generally perceived as "weird," the
more it should have acted to terminate him.
Even so, many questions remain. Once Garcia and Doe had been
introduced incident to Garcia's employment, what could the hospital
have done even if it had been fully on notice that Garcia was groom-
254. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 585, 961 P.2d at 1188. See another articulation of this
argument in Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho at 1043, 895 P.2d at 1236.
255. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 582, 961 P.2d at 1185 (Schroeder, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing from "the pertinent portions... of the district court" opinion).
256. Id. at 585, 961 P.2d at 1188.
257. Id.
258. Id. It's all in how you put it. The Idaho Court of Appeals, characterizing the
same evidence, wrote: "Garcia's employment was... terminated for misconduct involving
young male employees of the hospital. The termination was based on allegations that
Garcia had repeatedly invited these employees, who were under twenty-one years of age,
to his home and offered to provide alcohol to them." Sisters of the Holy Cross, 126 Idaho at
1037-38, 895 P.2d at 1230-31.
259. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 585, 961 P.2d at 1188 (Schroeder, J., dissenting).
260. Certainly the district court seems to be overstepping its bounds to declare
that Garcia's overtures to the young but adult co-workers could not possibly be found to
be suggestive of attraction to underage males. Id. That is a classic jury question requiring
expert testimony from those who treat sex offenders.
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ing Doe? The hospital need avoid only gross negligence or worse. An
agent of the hospital could have warned Doe or his parents, but at the
risk of defamation and violation of privacy suits from Garcia. The em-
ployer hospital may well have won those suits, but only after ex-
tended litigation. Perhaps the rational fear of that litigation is enough
to lead a jury--or a judge in the pretrial hearing allowed by title 6,
section 1607(3) of the Idaho Code 2 61-- to find no gross negligence. On
the other hand, if Garcia had reasonably appeared to be engaged in
his business but had engaged in bodily touching, the hospital could
still be liable for improper touching even without proof of gross negli-
gence.
3. Rife v. Long Factors
The court, in allowing the case to proceed to the jury, engaged in
a general discussion of the sources of duty, addressing the Rife v.
Long duty factors. 262 The court mentions Rife and the list of factors
considered and weighed when "[d]etermining whether a duty will
arise."263 The court then goes on to discuss those factors "ask[ing] un-
der Rife ... whether there is a genuine issue of material fact concern-
ing" the factors.264 This is an incorrect application of Rife and of duty
analysis. Duty is a determination made, as a matter of law, by the
judge. The Rife factors, as such, are not to be turned over to the jury
for factual determination. Doubtless the jury will consider all of those
factors, but it will do so in the context of determining breach, actual
cause, proximate cause, and damage. As written, Garcia could lead to
some confusion.2
65
B. Hunter v. State Department of Corrections
At the time of his crimes, Hood was a current employee of Mr.
Wash but was far removed from both Mr. Wash's premises and the
scope of his employment. 266 The essence of the Hunters' claims is that
Mr. Wash's management had been told to keep Hood from interacting
with minors, yet failed to do S0.267 Mr. Wash's management did not
261. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1607(3) (2004).
262. Garcia, 131 Idaho at 581, 961 P.2d at 1184 (citing Rife v. Long, 127 Idaho
841, 846, 908 P.2d 143, 148 (1995)).
263. Id. (quoting Rife, 127 Idaho at 846, 908 P.2d at 148) (emphasis added).
264. Id.
265. Suggested by Dale Goble, Professor, University of Idaho College of Law.
266. Hunter v. State Dep't of Corr., 138 Idaho 44, 46, 57 P.3d 755, 757 (2002).
Hunter was decided in 2002, but does not mention title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code,
which was passed in 1999. This may be because the crime occurred in 1996.
267. Id.
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know the nature of Hood's conviction, but should nonetheless have
obeyed the probation officer given her superior knowledge of the
terms of his probation.
268
Attempting to apply title 6, section 1607269 to this matter is
tricky. If Mr. Wash were held liable for its failure to obey, liability
would be to some extent "based upon an employer/employee relation-
ship."270 It would not necessarily be "for [an] act or omission of a cur-
rent employee," but rather for its own failure to protect its other em-
ployee, Hunter.271 Also, if Mr. Wash was going to hire a known pa-
rolee, it was arguably gross negligence to disregard the parole officer's
instructions about something as important as the protection of mi-
nors.
The Hunter opinion's greatest fault is its failure to elucidate a
rule. Insofar as a rule can be inferred, it is overbroad. Hunter was
written as a duty decision. While the court more or less acknowledged
the factual causal link between the employer and the death, 272 it over-
turned the jury verdict finding for the plaintiffs. The court did this
with little legal analysis. In a section that purportedly discussed
whether or not a duty existed, the court emphasized extending duty
"too far," and the inability of defendant to "anticipate what bad conse-
quences might result."273 These concerns have more the ring of proxi-
mate cause or breach than of duty. But proximate cause and breach
are jury questions, and the court expressed displeasure that the mat-
ter had been sent to the jury. The court wanted to end the inquiry
with a determination of "no duty." The simplest way (in the absence of
the statute) to get there would have been to call on the Rife factors
and conclude, as a matter of law in this case, that too few of those fac-
tors weighed in plaintiffs' favor: this particular harm to plaintiff was
largely unforeseeable, the connection between the defendant em-
ployer's negligence and the harm that in fact occurred was insuffi-
ciently close, the employer was insufficiently blameworthy relative to
268. Id.
269. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1607 (2004).
270. Id. § 6-1607(1).
271. Id. § 6-1607(2). Mr. Wash's supervisory employees did not necessarily know
Hunter's age. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 46, 57 P.3d at 757. The supervisors' obvious construc-
tive knowledge, from her employment records, was not mentioned in the opinion.
Hunter's status as an employee is relevant primarily in order to establish that Mr. Wash
owed her a duty, albeit one that would normally be discussed in the workers' compensa-
tion system rather than the district court. That duty may or may not have been extin-
guished when Hunter quit her job.
272. Id. at 50-51, 57 P.3d at 761-62.
273. Id. at 50, 57 P.3d at 761.
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other parties, and the burden on the community was too great if hir-
ing of probationers was as chilled as allowing recovery in this case
would likely have made it.
However, the court apparently intended to establish a broader
"no duty" rule. In this the court itself went too far. Quite a few em-
ployer duties remain after Hunter; a matter the court should clarify at
some point in the future. The Hunter court believed that plaintiffs,
and the Garcia court, took the employer's duty "too far," but it gave no
content to that phrase.274 Instead the court made the following asser-
tions without clearly indicating which was determinative:
a) Hunter was no longer employed by Mr. Wash when she was raped
and killed, and the event did not occur in connection with work. 275
b) There is no general duty to control the actions of another, but "one
owes the duty to every person in our society to use reasonable care to
avoid injury to the other person in any situation in which it could be
reasonably anticipated or foreseen that such a failure to use such care
might result in such injury."276
c) In prior cases, like Alegria v. Payonk,277 a duty was found when bar-
tenders had acted affirmatively by serving liquor to an obviously in-
toxicated minor. The Hunter court described "[t]he theory of the [Ale-
gria] case was that the bartenders had acted affirmatively; they
served the minor before he got in his automobile." 278
d) The decision in Doe v. Garcia, was on a motion for summary
judgment, determining that there was a material fact in dis-
pute which precluded summary judgment. In this case
[Hunter] the facts were fully developed at trial.
Submitting [Hunter] to the jury was consistent with Doe
274. Id.
275. Id. at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
276. Id. at 50, 57 P.3d at 761 (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101 Idaho 617, 619, 619
P.2d 135, 137 (1980)).
277. 101 Idaho 617, 619 P.2d 135. In Alegria bartenders had the doubly bad
judgment to illegally serve alcohol to a minor who was obviously intoxicated. Id. at 618,
619 P.2d at 136. The minor then caused a car accident which killed Mrs. Alegria. Id. The
court allowed her family to sue the bars where the minor had been served. Id. at 621, 619
P.2d at 139.
278. 138 Idaho at 50, 57 P.3d at 761. The Hunter court emphasized that, in ap-
parent contrast to Mr. Wash, the Alegria bartenders had affirmatively undertaken to act.
Id. But the court failed to distinguish the "action" of serving drinks from the "action" of
putting an employee on the payroll, giving him a badge and a coat, and attending to all
the details attached to undertaking to hire someone.
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v. Garcia, but that case and this case extend the duty of an
employer too far for consequences outside employment .... 279
e) The staff at the North Idaho Correctional Institution, the judge who
placed Hood on probation, and the probation officer who supervised
him did not foresee that Hood would murder. "Imposing a duty on Mr.
Wash to anticipate what bad consequences might result from placing
Hood where he would have contact with a minor girl reaches too
far. 280
f) "Mr. Wash was found to have half as much responsibility for
Hunter's death as Hood who actually killed her. That defies common
sense."
281
h) This case "illustrates the hazards of putting an emotionally
charged issue to an understandably sympathetic jury."
282
These assertions raise more questions than they answer. 28 The
court's primary distaste for the finding of liability arose from the lack
of foreseeability of the murder to anyone, including to people far more
expert in criminology than the owners and operators of a car wash.
While some crime, especially a sexual crime, would not have been un-
expected, the murder was not foreshadowed by Hood's admittedly
279. Id. Justice Schroeder, who wrote the opinion in Hunter, was the sole dissent
in Garcia.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 51, 57 P.3d at 762.
282. Id.
283. Another question, now nearly moot because of title 6, section 1607 of the
Idaho Code, concerns the effect of Hunter on Garcia. James C. Dale, Editor of Idaho Em-
ployment Law Letter, noted that "[alithough not specifically stated in Hunter's case, the
court seems to have reversed the older case of Doe v. Garcia." Dale & Hollister, supra
note 57. Obviously this secondary source cannot determine the fate of Garcia. The answer
must be gleaned from the language of the Hunter opinion. The words "overturned" or "ab-
rogated" cannot be found in the passage concerning Garcia, but Hunter's disapproval of
Garcia is unmistakable: "that case... extend[s] the duty of an employer too far." Hunter,
138 Idaho at 50, 57 P.3d at 61. In keeping with the principles of judicial conservatism, the
Hunter opinion did not opine about hypothetical fact patterns not in front of it, and re-
stricted its commentary to the facts of Garcia as established at the time of summary
judgment and to the facts as established at trial in Hunter itself. Garcia was not dead af-
ter Hunter; much room was left for lawyers to argue for liability if an employer had more
control than Mr. Wash, or if the events were more directly connected to the workplace
than Hood and Hunter's encounters in his apartment after she had ceased to be employed
by Mr. Wash.
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criminal past.28 4 Concerning the state's liability, the court found that
ultimately no substantial and competent evidence existed to support
the jury's verdict that the state was reckless. 2 5 But the court held
that the state was not immune and that the mater was correctly sub-
mitted to the jury.
286
Yet the heading of the section concerning Mr. Wash's liability
reads "The Claim of Negligence Should Not Have Been Submitted to
the Jury."28 7 The court did not explain why the jury should not have
had a chance to assess the employer's behavior, just as it did the
state's. The employer's carelessness was arguably easier to establish
than the state's, because the employer had direct information that
Hood "was not to interact with minors."288 The court purported to
make a determination that Mr. Wash still had no duty. But reading
the opinion as a whole, the court was actually making a finding that
no substantial evidence supported the jury's finding of breach by Mr.
Wash despite the warning from the probation officer. 28 9 This would
mirror the court's finding that no evidence supported a finding that
the state was reckless.
If so, this is more nearly a breach or proximate cause holding
than a duty holding. Insofar as the employer took an unreasonable
risk by disobeying a probation officer and risking inappropriate sexual
encounters between a minor employee and the adult employee, the
scope of that risk did not encompass a risk of murder.290 This torque
in the foreseeability analysis could be addressed in breach 291 (what
harm should have been-foreseen in order to be avoided) or proximate
284. Experts in criminology could shed light on the likelihood of a statutory rap-
ist, or a forcible rapist, to murder.
285. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 49-50, 57 P.3d at 760-61.
286. Id. at 48, 57 P.3d at 759. The court rejected the State's argument that it was
immune. Id.
287. Id. at 50, 57 P.3d at 761.
288. Id. at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
289. Id. at 49-50, 57 P.3d at 760-61. The standard for taking the factual deter-
mination of breach away from the jury is that based on the evidence before the court, rea-
sonable minds could not differ that no breach of duty occurred. Id. at 47, 57 P.3d at 758.
The factual determination of actual causation can also be taken away from the jury if
reasonable minds could not differ. The State's brief raised an actual cause issue not dis-
cussed by the court in its opinion: that Hunter met Hood before her employment at Mr.
Wash. See State Brief, supra note 60, at 5. If so, Mr. Wash was not a major factor, if it
was a factor at all, in the causal chain of events. If that evidence was uncontroverted, the
matter of Mr. Wash's liability should not have been submitted to the jury.
290. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 50, 57 P.3d at 761; cf Caldwell v. Idaho Youth Ranch,
Inc., 132 Idaho 120, 968 P.2d 215 (1998).
291. Foreseeability is also addressed by the judge, in general terms, as one of the
Rife v. Long duty factors. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 49-50, 57 P.3d at 760-61.
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cause 292 (was the harm foreseeable and thereby within the scope of de-
fendant's responsibility).
293
Given the rarity of similar scenarios, Hunter would be of minimal
precedential value as a breach or proximate cause case to employers
as a general class. Perhaps the court was trying to relieve Idaho em-
ployers by writing the case as a more generalized duty decision. But
as some duties remain alive even after Hunter and the passage of title
6, section 1607, the employers of Idaho, in attempting to determine
the limits of their liability, should posit for themselves the more likely
scenario: what if Hood had not been murdered but had been raped by
Hunter. Would Mr. Wash have been liable? That rape would have
been foreseeable based on the probation officer's proscription to Mr.
Wash's managers. The Hunter opinion does not provide guidance on
whether the rape victim would have a successful cause of action, or if
that cause of action would fail at the duty, breach, or proximate cause
stage of tort analysis.
The court mentioned that Hunter was no longer an employee of
Mr. Wash without explaining the significance of that statement.294 In
order to further test the limits of employer liability, imagine that the
victim was not an employee but another child not in a special rela-
tionship with the employer. For example, the victim could be a child
living in the area of the car wash who began chatting with the em-
ployees of the business, including the sex offender employee. The ba-
sic common law duty rule, reiterated by Hunter, is that one does not
have a duty to control the conduct of another even though, at the
292. Foreseeability also plays into a standard intervening cause analysis. The
employee's crime is an intervening cause between defendant's negligent oversight of the
workplace and plaintiffs' harm. Criminal acts are generally so extraordinary as to be su-
perceding causes. While a sexual crime might have been sufficiently foreseeable in this
case for a jury to find no superceding cause, a murder was exceedingly unforeseeable and
extraordinary and, hence, arguably superceding.
293. The Hunter case leads us toward the classic proximate cause conundrum.
Many readers may remember "the familiar instances of the running down of a pedestrian
by a safely driven but carelessly loaded car, or of the explosion of unlabeled rat poison, in-
flammable but not known to be, placed near a coffee burner." Petition of Kinsman Transit
Co., 338 F.2d 708, 724 n.9 (2d Cir. 1964) (citing Larrimore v. Am. Natl Ins. Co., 89 P.2d
340 (1939)). Even if Mr. Wash was negligent as to the risk of allowing Hood to interact
with Hunter, the harm foreseen would have been statutory rape not murder. It may well
be that this removes the murder from Mr. Wash's scope of responsibility, as foreseeability
is an essential inquiry for proximate cause. The link between proximate cause and the
duty to prevent (or not to bring about) third party misconduct is noted by the drafters of
the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 17(c) (Discussion Draft 1999).
294. The employment status of the victim is not important in Idaho. IDAHO CODE
ANN. § 6-1607 (2004).
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same time, one does owe a duty to every person to avoid injury if it
would be "reasonably anticipated or foreseen that a failure to use
[due] care might result in such injury."295 The hypothetical employer
would have had direct information about the impropriety of allowing
the child to associate with the sex offender employee. The high fore-
seeability of sexual misconduct, the vulnerability of the child, and the
causal role played by the employer in creating the situation all might
lead to a finding of duty in this hypothetical situation.
The court ended its opinion by stating: "The man who actually
killed Hunter had virtually all, if not all the responsibility for her
death. Finding otherwise illustrates the hazards of putting an emo-
tionally charged issue to an understandably sympathetic jury. Mr.
Wash had no duty that extended to this tragic event."296 Surely this
was a throw-away passage, not a holding to eliminate all third party
liability for crimes and intentional torts. The court was correct to
highlight the absurdity of the jury's apportionment of Hood's negli-
gence at 40%.297 But the court mistakenly implied that the fault lay
with the jury. It is misplaced and disingenuous to blame jurors for the
incoherence of the legal system. The legal doctrines of comparative
fault and apportionment of negligence are ill-named and not entirely
well conceived. The names of the doctrines emphasize fault and negli-
gence. But really, when asked to make comparative "fault" assess-
ments, jurors are being asked to assess two things: the degree of cul-
pability (breach) and the degree of causal connection (actual and
proximate cause). Then the jurors are asked to merge these two as-
sessments into one falsely objective number to "apportion" the liabil-
ity in the form of a percentage. To add to the confusion, proportioning
"negligence" in this case is inapposite, for Hood was not really negli-
gent at all. He was, one hundred percent, an intentional tortfeasor
and a criminal.
The jury here did find both breach and proximate cause against
Mr. Wash. That ruling was upheld by the judge in the face of a re-
quest for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and for a new
trial,298 which lends credence to the rationality of the verdict. The
court's dismissive appraisal of the jury as "emotional" seems unwar-
ranted, especially when juxtaposed to the trial judge's refusal to dis-
turb the verdict.
As written, this case sends several displeasing messages. Facts
as extraordinary as those in Hunter are not likely to arise very often.
295. Hunter, 138 Idaho at 50, 57 P.3d at 761 (quoting Alegria v. Payonk, 101
Idaho 617, 619, 619 P.2d 135, 137 (1980)).
296. Id. at 51, 57 P.3d-at 762.
297. Id. at 46, 57 P.3d at 757.
298. Id.
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The court may have considered these claims to be far-fetched, but its
discourteous, disrespectful, and gratuitous mention of the flirtatious-
ness of plaintiffs' dead daughter 299 may discourage the bringing of
many other claims to the courts of Idaho. In other tragedies, defen-
dants may not be deterred or held responsible in circumstances where
they are more clearly or directly responsible for injury than was Mr.
Wash in this case.
Most troubling, for the purposes of this article, is the court's
cavalier removal of responsibility from the employer's shoulders. The
employer is allowed, without legal consequence, to ignore the direct
instruction of a parole officer. Reintegration of parolees into society is
important, but it cannot be achieved without due care and diligence
on the part of all participants in the reintegration process. Again, rea-
sonable minds could differ on whether sufficient proximate cause
linked Hood's crimes to Mr. Wash's disregard of the instructions, but
that is grounds to send the matter to a jury, not to relieve the em-
ployer of liability at the duty stage.
C. Hei v. Holzer
This opinion is convoluted to read, perhaps because of the myriad
causes of action, governmental liability issues, and apparently uneven
prosecution of the case by plaintiffs. The court is surprisingly uncen-
sorious of a relationship between a high school teacher and a high
school junior.30 0 But whether or not Hei and Holzer's relationship was
tortious is a question of social or educational policy, not one of tort
duty.3 0 ' The question for this article is whether the school district
would be responsible for the frolic of its servant, Holzer. The statute
was not discussed in the opinion.30 2
Hei was successful in her claims that the district/employer owed
her a duty to protect her. These duties arose statutorily from Title IX
and title 33, section 512 of the Idaho Code, and out of a common law
299. Id.; see also supra note 57.
300. 139 Idaho 81, 73 P.3d 94 (2003). Justice Walters, in dissent, was especially
concerned that a condemnation of Hei and Holzer's relationship might translate into the
university setting. Id. at 89, 73 P.3d at 102 (Walters, J., dissenting). The need for stricter
order at a high school, and the overwhelming presence of students under eighteen would
seem to be sufficient for differentiation.
301. The most obvious candidate for emotional injury would be Mrs. Holzer. In-
jury to Hei is understood only after contemplating her youth and her status as Holzer's
student and a student at the school.
302. Idaho Code section 6-1607 was passed in 1999, but the complaint in this
2003 case was filed two years earlier, in 1997. Id. at 84, 73 P.3d at 97.
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duty owed by schools to pupils. This seems in keeping with tort law. A
duty to supervise with due care flows from this duty of protection.
This duty is not based on an "employer/employee relationship" be-
tween defendant and a third party, but rather on the district/pupil re-
lationship between defendant and plaintiff. Further the statute ex-
pressly disavows any intention to limit people's rights under the anti-
discrimination statutes, so Hei's Title IX claim would not be extin-
guished.
303
It seems appropriate that no duty to control arose out of the em-
ployer's relationship with the employee, because there was no allega-
tion of any special knowledge that this employee was dangerous. The
duty to control Holzer--or "supervise," as it is termed in the case-
arose out of the relationship between the pupil Hei and the school and
the district.
Actual cause is problematic in this case, because Hei interacted
with Holzer outside of school as well as in school.304 Contemplating
this causal point exposes our conception of duty. If the school did not
create the situation and was not the actor setting in motion the rela-
tionship between Hei and Holzer, we tend to say "it wasn't their
fault." Fault, of course, is the word that most technically denotes neg-
ligence in behavior. But in spoken English it also can mean actual
cause (they made a potentially bad choice but it did not hurt anyone)
or even proximate cause (even if they were a technical cause we will
not hold them responsible, we will not blame them).
Ironically, in this case where liability would probably be allowed
even if title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code were applied, the em-
ployer's alleged negligence does not leap out from the pages of this
opinion overruling summary judgement. Unlike the astonishing facts
of Garcia and Hunter, scenarios similar to those in Hei are more com-
mon. The employee's act was not criminal, the damage was emotional
rather than physical, and plaintiffs own actions and consent were
contributing factors. 305 Holzer's employment at the school provided
the potential for abuse; the nature of the job further enhanced that
potential. The role of teacher and coach easily and properly becomes
one of advisor, counselor, and confidant; the problem arises when the
confidant becomes the intimate and the lover. One message of the
case is that the school district, well aware of this potential progres-
sion, needs to be on the lookout and take reasonable steps to protect
pupils from abuse. The jury will determine what steps were reason-
303. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 6-1607(4) (2004).
304. See supra notes 68-76 and accompanying text.
305. Obviously, the essence of plaintiffs claims is that the age and power differ-
ential rendered the relationship abusive and quasi-nonconsentual.
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able in the factual context of the case.
This decision reaches beyond the schoolhouse. It sets precedent
for employers who must protect the vulnerable who may encounter
employees who, under the cloak of authority, can do harm.
V. CONCLUSION
Even after Hunter and title 6, section 1607 of the Idaho Code,
Idaho employers may be successfully sued for failing to think about
liability to others for the bad acts of their employees. Naturally, em-
ployers must be on the lookout for simple negligent performance of
duty. But employers also must hire with care, looking out for signs of
proclivities to do harm that might not be in the course of employment
but that are foreseeable because of the background of the prospective
worker, the vulnerability of the people with whom the worker will
come in contact, the nature of the contact the worker will have with
others, and so forth. Employers must consider the possibility of abuse
of authority, or color of authority (including uniforms, badges, and the
like), by current and past employees. Related to this is the possibility
that a worker could blend proper, work-related activities with im-
proper activities. The more vulnerable the potential victims, the
higher the duty owed to them. It is still true that the master has a fair
degree of responsibility for the acts of the servant-and even the ex-
servant.

